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Abstract: This paper characterizes the current South African Customs Union (SACU) tariff structure, 
considers its rationale, proposes and evaluates some alternatives for reform. While considerable progress 
was made earlier in liberalizing and simplifying SACU’s tariff structure, over the past few years such 
movement appears to have halted. This is unfortunate because trade performance is a key constraint in 
attaining South Africa’s growth objectives. The tariff structure remains excessively complex and opaque 
and biased against exports. The differentiation provided to different sectors appears mainly to be the 
result of historical accident and is not justifiable as efficient job preservation, equitable income 
distribution or on infant industry grounds. 
 
Some still continue to defend the complex structure as necessary to provide producers of particular 
products with precisely the amount of protection they need to become competitive. But their arguments 
are unconvincing. There may be a case for exceptional temporary safeguards and infant industry 
protection but a broad complex structure is likely to allocate resources inefficiently: channelling them 
away from activities in which South Africa is competitive and towards those in which it is less efficient. 
Protection of inputs is particularly damaging and distorting of the choices of those seeking to beneficiate 
and export. In addition, the government simply does not have the requisite information (or instruments) to 
apply such differentiation appropriately to such a large number of products. Inevitably, therefore the 
structure encourages and reflects rent seeking. 
 
Using simple tariff structures that have a zero and just one or two tariff bands we show that it is possible 
simultaneously to provide benefits to consumers, limit employment dislocation by conferring a reasonable 
degree of effective protection on finished goods, reduce export taxes, improve transparency and provide a 
norm against which industrial policy priorities can be set. The long run goal would be a globally 
competitive SACU region that provides producers with access to inputs at world prices. 
 
South Africa’s regional trade policies require attention. The African continent plays a key strategic role in 
South Africa’s export diversification strategy and regional development is a vital priority. The current 
SACU tariff sharing formula is expensive and defective. A major reform of SACU tariffs would make 
particular sense for the BLNS countries, allowing these nations access to cheaper inputs and final 
products. It would also provide the opportunity to renegotiate the SACU revenue-sharing formula, more 
clearly and rationally separating its aid and tariff-revenue sharing components. SACU should avoid 
unrealistic commitments to customs unions with other African partners. In its other regional arrangements 
(e.g. with SADC) SACU should place primary reliance on free trade agreements and other projects (e.g. 
infrastructure) that enhance integration. 
Keywords: trade policy, regional integration, South Africa, trade simulations 
 
JEL Codes:  F13, F15, F17 
 
This paper is part of the CID South Africa Growth Initiative. This project is an initiative of the National 
Treasury of the Republic of South Africa within the government’s Accelerated and Shared Growth 
Initiative (ASGI-SA), which seeks to consolidate the gains of post-transition economic stability and 
accelerate growth in order to create employment and improve the livelihoods of all South Africans. For 
more information and the entire series of papers, visit the project's web site at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/southafrica. 
 1
SACU Tariff Policies: Where should they go from here? 
By
Lawrence Edwards and Robert Z Lawrence

* Lawrence Edwards is an Associate Professor at the University of Cape Town; Robert Lawrence 
is the Albert L Williams Professor of International Trade and Investment at the John F Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University and a Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC. We thank Iza Lejarraga and Owen Willcox for research assistance. 
 2
ABSTRACT 
 This paper characterizes the current SACU tariff structure, considers its rationale, 
proposes and evaluates some alternatives for reform. While considerable progress was 
made earlier in liberalizing and simplifying SACU’s tariff structure, over the past few 
years such movement appears to have halted. This is unfortunate because trade 
performance is a key constraint in attaining South Africa’s growth objectives.  The tariff 
structure remains excessively complex and opaque and biased against exports. The 
differentiation provided to different sectors appears mainly to be the result of historical 
accident and is not justifiable as efficient job preservation, equitable income distribution 
or on infant industry grounds.  
 Some still continue to defend the complex structure as necessary to provide 
producers of particular products with precisely the amount of protection they need to 
become competitive. But their arguments are unconvincing. There may be a case for 
exceptional temporary safeguards and infant industry protection but a broad complex 
structure is likely to allocate resources inefficiently: channelling them away from 
activities in which South Africa is competitive and towards those in which it is less 
efficient. Protection of inputs is particularly damaging and distorting of the choices of 
those seeking to beneficiate and export. In addition, the government simply does not have 
the requisite information (or instruments) to apply such differentiation appropriately to 
such a large number of products.  Inevitably, therefore the structure encourages and 
reflects rent seeking. 
 Using simple tariff structures that have a zero and just one or two tariff bands we 
show that it is possible simultaneously to provide benefits to consumers, limit 
employment dislocation by conferring a reasonable degree of effective protection on 
finished goods, reduce export taxes, improve transparency and provide a norm against 
which industrial policy priorities can be set.  The long run goal would be a globally 
competitive SACU region that provides producers with access to inputs at world prices.  
 South Africa’s regional trade policies require attention. The African continent 
plays a key strategic role in South Africa’s export diversification strategy and regional 
development is a vital priority. The current SACU tariff sharing formula is expensive and 
defective. A major reform of SACU tariffs would make particular sense for the BLNS 
countries, allowing these nations access to cheaper inputs and final products.  It would 
also provide the opportunity to renegotiate the SACU revenue-sharing formula, more 
clearly and rationally separating its aid and tariff-revenue sharing components. SACU 
should avoid unrealistic commitments to customs unions with other African partners. In 
its other regional arrangements (e.g. with SADC) SACU should place primary reliance on 
free trade agreements and other projects (e.g. infrastructure) that enhance integration  
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SACU Tariff Policies: Where should they go from here? 
 The tariff structure that South Africa (and SACU) inherited from the apartheid era was 
defective on at least five counts. First, reflecting the import – substitution orientation of the 
government, it was extremely protectionist.  This had the effect not only of discouraging imports 
but also of taxing exports by raising production costs. Second, the structure was both complex 
and opaque. There were over 200 different rates, and tariffs took a number of forms:  ad valorem, 
specific, mixed, compound, and formula duties based on reference prices. This made it very 
difficult to estimate how much protection was actually being granted. As a result, a World Bank 
Study (Belli et al., 1993) concluded that by the end of the 1980s compared to a range of 
developing countries, South Africa had the highest number of tariff rates, the widest range of 
tariffs and the second highest level of tariff dispersion. Third, SACU decision-making processes 
were unrepresentative. South Africa unilaterally determined tariffs, while other SACU members 
were forced to simply fall in line. Fourth, the arrangements for sharing tariff revenues while 
relatively generous to other SACU members were problematic because they committed South 
Africa to pay amounts that did not reflect the actual tariff revenue generated and in fact payments 
could have eventually turned out to be greater than the tariff revenues actually received.  And 
finally, since apartheid South Africa, as a pariah state, was not a feasible partner, the arrangement 
presented structural problems for SACU in its relationships with other trading partners.   
 Some progress has been made in ameliorating all of these problems. (a) As summarized 
in Table 1, the SACU trade regime has undergone considerable liberalization. Between 1990 and 
2006, the average applied rate was reduced from 27.5 to 8.2 percent. Although the GEIS subsidy 
for exporters was eliminated, the anti-export bias of the tariff structure was considerably reduced 
because of tariff reductions on inputs. (b) The tariff structure has also been simplified. The 
number of different MFN bands was 209 as recently as 2000, but it has been cut in half - to 100 in 
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2006. The proportion of duty free MFN tariff lines is up from 44.6 percent to 52.9 percent and 
non ad-valorem tariffs which were 25.6 percent of all MFN tariffs now comprise just 2.9 percent 
of all MFN tariffs. (c) In 2002, in a new SACU Agreement, commitments were made for 
increasing the participation of the BLNS (Botswana, Lesotho, Namiba and Swaziland) in SACU 
decision-making, (d) At the same time, the 2002 Agreement implemented a new revenue sharing 
formula (RSF) that prevented South Africa from having to pay out more than its tariff revenues; 
and finally (e) a number of regional initiatives have been negotiated and implemented, most 
notably South Africa’s accession to the SADC trade protocol and its Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the European Union.  
Table 1: Structure of MFN tariffs of SACU, 1990-06 
      MFN MFN MFN 2006 
  1990 1997 2000 2001 2002 MFN EU SADC Total 
1. Number of tariff lines > 13000   7824   7888 6420 6420 6420   
2. Number of different rates (bands) 200   209   150 100 95 9 150
3. Bound tariff lines (% of all tariff lines)a  96.4 96.4 96.4 96.2 96.6       
4. Duty-free tariff lines (% of all tariff lines)  42.4 44.6 44.5 43.6 52.9 65.9 99.4 72.7
5. Non-ad valorem tariffs (% of all tariff lines)  25.6 24.8 24.6 2.9 2.9 2.3 0.1 1.8
6. Tariff quotas (% of all tariff lines)  8.1 7.4 7.2 7.3 .. .. ..  
7. Simple average applied rate 27.5 15 12.8 12 11 8.2 4.8 0.1   
8. Import weighted average        6.6 7.4 7.9 0.1 7.3
9. Maximum rate 1389   187   78 108 108 60 108
10. Minimum rate 0   0   0 0 0 0   
11. Agricultural products (HS01-24)  11.4 11.3 11.4 11.5 9.4 5.5 0.0   
12. Non-agricutural products (HS25-97)  15.4 12.9 12 11.4 8.0 4.7 0.1   
13. Domestic tariff "spikes" (% of all tariff lines)b  4 5.8 4.5 4.5 8.8 14 0.4   
14. International tariff "spikes" (% of all tariff 
lines)c  39.4 34.4 34.1 34.9 21 8.8 0.2 10
15. Overall standard deviation of applied rates  17.8 15.1 13.9 12.6 11.1 7.9 1.6 0
16. "Nuisance" applied rates (% of all tariff lines)d  0.2 0 0 1.4 1.3 0.8 0 0.7
.. Not available. 
n.a. Not applicable. 
a Refers to Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. Lesotho bound 100% of its tariff. 
b Domestic tariff spikes are defined as those exceeding three times the overall simple average 
applied rate (indicator 8.). 
c International tariff peaks are defined as those exceeding 15%. 
d Nuisance rates are those greater than zero, but less than or equal to 2%. 
Note: Indicators 3 and 6 are calculated taking into account all tariff lines (i.e. in-quota and out-of-
quota lines). 
Source: Source: WTO Trade policy report (2003) and own calculations. 
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 Nonetheless, as we will elaborate further, the tariff structure, the revenue sharing formula 
and South African regional trading arrangements all have scope for improvement.1 In the first 
section of this paper, we discuss some desirable characteristics of tariff structures and then 
characterize the current tariff structure in detail; in particular we provide measures of the nature 
of current protection, the degree to which exports are taxed and point to its complexity and 
opaque nature.  In the second section we consider possible justifications for the current structure 
such as the impact on employment, income distribution and infant industry protection. We find 
that none are convincing. Current tariffs are inefficient in general and particularly inefficient with 
the respect to their costs in supporting employment. They are regressive in their impact on 
income distribution and preservationist rather than strategic in their orientation.  We also consider 
and reject the argument that a highly differentiated structure is really necessary to provide 
producers of each individual product with precisely the protection they need. In our view a case-
by-case approach which sets individual tariffs differentially is more likely to be 
counterproductive, misallocate scarce resources in the economy and reduce South African living 
standards by giving the most protection to the activities in which South Africa is the least 
efficient economically and the most organized politically. 
 In the third section we show how the structure could be improved through a far simpler 
approach. Our tariff reform proposal is to simplify the tariff structure through the elimination of 
tariffs on intermediate and capital goods and the reduction of tariffs on final goods by fairly large 
percentages. This strategy relies heavily on the fact that what counts for any industry is its 
effective rather than nominal rate of protection. What each industry cares about is not the 
protection that is granted to the products that it produces but to the value that it adds. Tariff 
protection on intermediate inputs reduces value added, while protection on final goods increases 
value added. It is this basic notion that we exploit in our tariff liberalization design. By removing 
                                                 
1 Originally, for example under the Uruguay Round in contrast to the current 100 band system, 
South Africa was supposed to reduce the number of tariff rates to just six rates (0, 5,10,15,20, and 30 
percent). 
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tariffs on inputs, we are able to limit the reductions in effective protection represented by the 
reduction in final tariffs. In addition, import tariffs implicitly tax exports and confer negative rates 
of protection. So an approach which eliminates input tariffs will also stimulate exports by 
reducing or eliminating these penalties. 
 In the simulations we show that it is possible to find a structure that (a) provides a 
reasonable amount of effective protection for labour-intensive final goods production, (b) confers 
considerable benefits on SACU consumers thereby making the system less regressive, (c) reduces 
taxes on exports, (d) improves the transparency of the system, (e) provides a clear norm against 
which temporary exceptions for industrial policy and safeguard protection could be contrasted 
and (f) creates incentives for a more rational approach to SACU revenue sharing.  In the final 
section of the paper, we consider a more explicit division of the aid and tariff-revenue sharing 
components of the SACU revenue sharing formula. We also consider some options for SADC 
and South Africa’s trade relations with other African countries, in particular emphasizing the role 
of Free Trade Agreements rather than additional customs unions. 
 In focusing trade policy on these issues, we are aware that we are swimming somewhat 
against the tide. In recent years, the tariff structure has not continued to be a focus of policy. In 
part this reflects the view held by some, that the benefits from previous trade liberalization have 
been disappointing. In particular, that while it stimulated imports; liberalization did little to 
promote exports and thus contributed to the weak performance of employment growth in tradable 
goods.  It also reflects a belief that liberalization efforts in other developing countries and African 
countries in particular, have produced disappointing results.2 Industrial and other policies 
designed to improve productive capabilities are seen as necessary for these countries to become 
competitive exporters of manufactured goods. Accordingly, there are many who argue that before 
                                                 
2 Turok, B. (2007) “South Africa: EU agreement has “not been beneficial,” www.bilaterals.org 
[accessed May 2007]. See Also World Bank (2006), Lall and Kraemer-Mbula (2005) and Shafaeddin 
(2005). 
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South Africa undertakes further changes in its trade policy it needs to determine its overall 
industrial policy strategy. The DTI (2006: 11), for example, argues that “Industrial policy must 
lead trade policy more explicitly”. A further view is that unilateral reform cannot take place until 
the institutional structures as outlined in the 2002 SACU Agreement are established. Under this 
agreement changes to SACU tariff policy will be negotiated by all SACU members and decisions 
will be arrived at by consensus. Finally there is a view that whatever liberalization is undertaken 
should not be unilateral but instead implemented in the context of trade negotiations so that 
reciprocal concessions can be obtained from trading partners.3 
 The result is that South African trade policy appears to be in a holding pattern awaiting 
the development of an industrial policy and the conclusion of the Doha Round. But in our view, 
even if they do not implement it immediately, it could be helpful if South African trade 
policymakers had a clear idea of the direction in which trade policy should be moving and the 
general attributes of the approach that should be adopted. Without an understanding of what an 
appropriate tariff structure would look like, South Africa could find it difficult to respond to 
proposals in the Doha Round and in its regional trade negotiations. More importantly perhaps, 
clear guidelines on the desired structure of the tariff schedule and rules governing tariff changes 
are actually required for effective implementation of industrial policy. Reform of the current 
SACU tariff structure is therefore a pre-requisite for the development and implementation of a 
future industrial policy.  
 We should add that it is certainly true that for some South African producers, trade 
liberalization in the 1990s entailed painful adjustments.  But two points about this previous 
experience need to be stressed. First, South Africa was protecting many activities that were 
                                                 
3 This view is reflected in the DTI Industrial Strategy Document (2006: 22): “SA’s negotiating 
objectives in the WTO and bilaterals are aimed at: enhancing market access for products of export interests; 
eliminating industrial country subsidies and support to inefficient producers, particularly agriculture; and 
re-negotiating rules that perpetuate imbalances in the international trade regime.” 
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simply not viable without that protection – permanent infants -- and thus the previous policies 
were extremely inefficient and ultimately unsustainable at reasonable cost. Second, as we argued 
in our earlier paper, (Edwards and Lawrence, 2006) the regime was particularly discriminatory 
against the development of non-traditional exports. All in all, the evidence appears to indicate that 
the net impact of the liberalization on employment was actually fairly neutral over the 1990s 
(Edwards, 2001) and as Edwards and Lawrence demonstrate it did stimulate exports of non-
commodity manufactured goods. Thirdly, there is growing empirical evidence that trade 
liberalisation explains much of the improvement in productivity growth experienced in South 
Africa during the 1990s (Jonsson and Subramanian, 2001; Harding and Rattsø, 2005). Fourth, we 
advocate accompanying these measures with specific adjustment programs (see section three). 
 We believe that a radically simplified tariff structure should be implemented as soon as 
possible. However, we also believe that political and strategic decisions as to the timing and 
phasing in of implementation and the use of additional liberalization as a bargaining chip in the 
context of multilateral and regional negotiations are matters best left up to South African political 
decision-makers.  
 We should add three further prefatory remarks. First, by focussing on the tariff structure, 
we certainly do not mean to imply that it is a panacea, or a substitute for other policies designed 
to enhance SACU’s international competitiveness. Indeed, we advocate it as a complement to 
other forms of industrial policy, (See the papers by Hausmann, Rodrik and Sabel for this project). 
While we argue there should be a simple, generally applicable, tariff rule, we would still allow for 
a few priority sectors to be given exceptional tariff treatment on two grounds. On the one hand, 
industries that merit some form of infant industry protection; and on the other hand, industries 
that experience particularly difficult adjustment challenges (“substantial injury due to imports”) 
and merit protection in the form of temporary safeguards to limit dislocation.  In both cases, 
however, the “rule” whereby these exceptions are granted needs to be defined.   
 9
 But we would like to eliminate distinctive treatment between industries in the absence of 
a sound reason for doing so. Our analysis of the current structure, by contrast, suggests that much 
of it is simply a reflection of the relative strengths of previous sector lobbying efforts. As a result, 
it is riddled with inconsistencies and arbitrary decisions that have inadvertent effects. 4 At a 
minimum, the basis for differential treatment is not explicit and thus, even if protection was 
justifiable at some time in the past, it is hard to know if the original basis for that protection still 
prevails. It is inadequate to simply invoke the mantra of “infant industry” protection to justify 
whatever the existing level of tariffs is. The infant industry rationale must be justified on the 
grounds that the social costs of protection today will be more than offset by the gains from 
developing an industry that will be competitive in the long run.  But we will show below, that the 
current tariff structure is not actually designed with a view to developing industries that can 
eventually become competitive.  It appears, instead, as though currently the reason for trade 
protection is the idea that it is better to makes things locally than to import them. But this is a 
very weak rationale since it ignores the potential gains from trade and the costs of this behaviour 
need to be taken into account. 
 Second, it is important to remember that South Africa currently allows its exchange rate 
to float freely. As a result, protection keeps the exchange rate stronger than it would otherwise be. 
If protection is applied inefficiently, it imposes additional costs on the economy by hurting other 
sectors that could benefit from a more competitive exchange rate.  By contrast, trade 
liberalization would weaken the Rand and help spur producers that at the margin are more 
efficient in exporting and/or competing with imports.   
                                                 
4 Consider, for example that in 2004 tariff rates on fish included Salmon, Trout, and smoked fish 
at 25 percent while Tuna, Sole, Halibut, lobster and crabs were duty free. Rates were 35 percent for 
mangoes, 20 percent for strawberries, 15 percent for pineapples, 10 percent for dried apricots, 5 percent for 
bananas, oranges, grapes, pears and kiwi while nuts were duty free. Because black fermented tea was 
subject to a specific rate of $647.08 per ton, the ad valorem equivalent rate for packings greater than three 
kilos (kgs) was 29.53 percent but it was just 7.56 percent for packings less than 3 kgs. It is hard to 
understand why social welfare is enhanced by encouraging tea to be imported in small packings!. 
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 Third, in providing simulations that use specific numbers and classification schemes we 
do not intend to claim that they are necessarily the best ones. We simply mean to illustrate 
general approaches. In particular, to show how the principle of effective protection can be 
exploited to generate improvements and simplification. Ined, it is likely to be the case, that after 
further investigation and research, those responsible for tariff policies will come up with a 
different and more appropriate set of rates and classification system. But if, through this analysis, 
we can stimulate the exploration of such options, we will have achieved our purpose. 
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Section 1: Features of the current tariff structure 
In this section we explore several features of the current SACU tariff structure. In particular, we 
consider several measures of its restrictiveness, its effects on taxing exports and its complexity.  
 
Table 2: Summary of SACU tariff schedule 
 2006 
 
2006 MFN 
AVE
2006 EU 
AVE
2006 
SADC
AVE
Total 
Simple Average 8.2% 4.8% 0.1% 4.4%
Import weighted averages     
All goods 7.4% 7.9% 0.0% 7.3%
Final goods 20.2% 16.8% 0.3% 18.6%
Inputs 5.8% 8.5% 0.0% 6.5%
Trade Restriction Index     
All goods 14.8% 16.9% 0.8% 15.2%
Final goods 25.8% 26.7% 2.4% 26.0%
Inputs 12.3% 17.7% 0.9% 14.2%
     
Max 108% 108% 60% 108%
sd 11% 8% 2%  
coeff var 1.36 1.65 15.73  
     
Frequency     
less than or equal to 0% 53% 66% 99% 73%
0% < #lines  5% 7% 2% 0% 3%
5% < #lines  10% 9% 5% 0% 5%
10% < #lines  15% 10% 18% 0% 9%
15% < #lines  20% 8% 2% 0% 3%
20% < #lines  30% 9% 6% 0% 5%
more than 30% 4% 1% 0% 2%
Total lines 6,670 6,673 6,673 20,016 
Note: Passenger vehicles are included as both final goods and inputs (intermediate and capital goods). Ad 
valorem equivalents using 2006 import unit values are calculated for all non ad valorem rates. 
 
Protection. As is evident in Table 2, by the most relevant measures, protection actually remains 
quite significant in SACU even though a simple average of 2006 tariffs seems to indicate that the 
economy is quite open. The simple average of tariff lines, for example, is just 4.4 percent. 
However weighting lines by import shares raises the average rate to 7.3 percent.  And, as is well 
known, simple averages may understate protection for three reasons. They may use the wrong 
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weights, fail to take account of tariff variability and overlook the interactions within the tariff 
structure (through tariff escalation for example). 
 The problem with conventional import- weighted measures is that high tariffs will lead to 
low import volumes so the weights are biased downwards. In addition, import-weighted averages 
are poor measures of the welfare effects of tariff protection which, (with linear demand and 
supply curves) are proportional to the square of the tariff rate. The full extent of tariff distortion 
(size of the deadweight triangle) will be a function of both the height of the tariff as well as the 
elasticity of demand and supply. Thus, even if the average level is ten percent in both cases, if all 
tariffs are ten percent, there will be much less deadweight distortion than if half are zero and the 
other half are twenty percent.  
 Trade Restrictiveness Index.  To capture these considerations, we follow the work of 
Anderson and Neary (1994) to construct a trade restrictiveness index (TRI). We use the approach 
described in Feenstra (2005). The TRI is a measure of the uniform tariff that if applied to imports 
instead of the current structure of protection would leave home welfare at its current level.5 We 
calculate the TRI using 2006 tariffs for SACU and detailed product import elasticities obtained 
from Kee et al. (2004).6 This calculation indicates that import weighted average tariffs under-
estimate the restrictiveness of trade as measured by the uniform tariff TRI equivalent by 
                                                 
5 The TRI index can be calculated as:  
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where m is the import value, H is the elasticity of import demand and T is the tariff. The TRI is 
therefore the weighted sum of squared protection levels, where weights are given by the elasticity of import 
demand and imports.  
6 Hiau Looi Kee, Alessandro Nicita, Marcelo Olarreaga, 2006. Estimating Trade Restrictiveness 
Indices. The HS6 digit elasticities are applied uniformly to all sub-digits. Where no map was found, the 
simple average Hs4 digit elasticity was applied. 
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approximately 50 percent.7 The import weighted average tariff for MFN, EU and SADC 
combined equals 7.3 percent, while the TRI uniform equivalent is 15.2 percent. 8 
Another important consideration is the difference in tariff levels by end-use classification. 
We draw upon the Classification by Broad Economic Categories (BEC) maintained by UN 
Statistics. to identify final consumer goods, intermediate inputs and capital goods. The category 
“Passenger vehicles (BEC 51)” is both a capital good and a final consumption good and we 
therefore present measures of protection in Figure 1and Figure 2 for vehicles (all vehicle products 
including passenger vehicles) separately.   
Figure 1: Import weighted tariffs by end-use classification, 2006 
Import weighted tariffs by degree of processing
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
Capital goods Consumption goods Intermediate goods Grand Total
Excluding vehicles Including vehicles
 
                                                 
7 Kee et al. (2004) estimate a TRI (tariffs only) for South Africa of 13.6 and a TRI (tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers) of 16.2. However, these underestimate protection as they do not account for tariffs on 
HS98 Original equipment components, which are specific to South Africa, and have relatively high tariffs 
(26 percent) and high import volumes.  
8 The extent of under-estimation is similar to that found by Anderson (1998) for 27 other 
countries.   
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Figure 2: Trade restrictiveness index by end-use classification, 2006 
TRI by degree of processing
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Capital goods Consumption goods Intermediate goods Grand Total
Excluding vehicles Including vehicles
 
 In 2006, the average tariff on final consumer goods at 18.6 percent is substantially higher 
than that on capital goods (8.7 percent) and intermediate inputs (5.6 percent). The presence of 
tariff escalation means that Effective Rates of Protection (ERP) vastly exceed nominal rates, 
especially for finished goods (Figure 3).9 Indeed, input tariffs are generally lower than tariffs on 
final goods in almost all sectors besides printing, beverages, rubber and glass. Effective rates of 
protection on final consumption goods are very high (in excess of 100 percent) for clothing, 
textiles, leather, footwear and vehicles (Table 3).10 The GDP weighted average ERP in 
manufacturing for all final consumption goods is 40 percent. Production for the domestic market 
is thus much more attractive than production for exports – so in essence South Africa’s trade 
policy continues to heavily favour import substitution rather than exporting.  
                                                 
9 )1()( ¦¦  
i
ij
i
iijjj atatERP
 where tj is the tariff on outputs, ti is the tariff on inputs and aij is 
the quantity of intermediate input i used in the production of one unit of j. 
10 Effective protection rates are calculated according to the Balassa method. 
 15
 
Figure 3: GDP weighted effective rates of protection, 2006 
GDP weighted effective rates of protection by end-use and sector
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
All sectors Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Services
ERP final goods ERP inputs ERP average
 
Notes: HS 8-digit products are classified as Consumption goods (Final) or inputs (Capital and Intermediate 
goods) according to the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification available from UN Statistics. 
Passenger vehicles (BEC 51) are treated as both final and intermediate goods. ERP and export tax values 
are calculated using a SU table for 2002. The supply use table is deflated to world prices using the import 
weighted average tariff for each sector. In calculating ERP for final goods, we use the final tariff on outputs 
and the input tariff on intermediate inputs. For ERP input, we use the input tariff on both outputs and inputs 
and for ERP average we use the import weighted average tariff of all products to deflate final and 
intermediate goods. 
Tariffs include ad valorem equivalent for specific and mixed tariffs. Ad valorem equivalents for non-ad
valorem rates are calculated using import prices for 2006. 
ERP for motor vehicles and parts include the 27 percent import rebate. 
The 2002 GDP as provided by the SU table are used as weights. 
Table 3: Measures of protection by sector, 2006 
Final good 
tariff 
Input
tariff 
ERP final 
goods
ERP
inputs
Export
tax 
Anti-
export
bias final 
goods
Anti-export 
bias inputs 
Agriculture 6% 2% 7% 1% -3% 1.1 1.0 
Coal mining 0% 0% -2% -2% -2% 1.0 1.0 
Gold mining 0% 0% -1% -1% -1% 1.0 1.0 
Other mining 0% 0% -1% -1% -1% 1.0 1.0 
Food 12% 8% 51% 27% -15% 1.8 1.5 
Beverages 3% 5% 0.5% 9% -6% 1.1 1.2 
Tobacco 19% 14% 64% 45% -5% 1.7 1.5 
Textiles 23% 15% 139% 76% -10% 2.7 2.0 
Clothing 37% 20% 176% 75% 4% 2.6 1.7 
Leather prods 28% 7% 155% 13% -29% 3.6 1.6 
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Footwear 29% 0% 153% -23% -18% 3.1 0.9 
Wood & prods 21% 3% 61% 5% -5% 1.7 1.1 
Paper & prods 17% 2% 65% 3% -6% 1.8 1.1 
Printing 0% 4% -3% 7% -3% 1.0 1.1 
Petrol ref 0% 0% 1% 1% -1% 1.0 1.0 
Basic chems 1% 2% -1% 4% -3% 1.0 1.1 
Other chems 2% 2% 2% 2% -6% 1.1 1.1 
Rubber prods 8% 14% 35% 66% -7% 1.5 1.8 
Plastic prods 16% 11% 50% 31% -8% 1.6 1.4 
Glass & prods 4% 8% 6% 20% -5% 1.1 1.3 
Non-met mins 24% 5% 76% 12% -3% 1.8 1.2 
Bas iron & st 0% 2% -5% 5% -4% 1.0 1.1 
Bas n-fer met 0% 0% -1% 1% -1% 1.0 1.0 
Metal prods 17% 5% 58% 14% -5% 1.7 1.2 
Machinery 12% 0% 40% -4% -4% 1.5 1.0 
Electr mach 11% 5% 39% 11% -8% 1.5 1.2 
Tv & coms eq 9% 1% 24% 0% -2% 1.3 1.0 
Scientific eq 0% 0% -4% -4% -3% 1.0 1.0 
Motveh & parts 31% 26% 153% 117% 14% 2.2 1.9 
Oth trnsp eq 2% 0% 5% -2% 0% 1.0 1.0 
Furniture 18% 16% 51% 43% -7% 1.6 1.5 
Oth industry 4% 2% 6% 1% -4% 1.1  
Electricity   -1% -1% -1% 1.0  
Water suppl   -1% -1% -1% 1.0  
Construct   -8% -8% -6% 1.0  
Civil eng   -4% -4% -4% 1.0  
Trade   -1% -1% -1% 1.0  
Cat & accomm   -4% -4% -4% 1.0  
Trnsp & stor   -4% -4% -3% 1.0  
Communcat   -2% -2% -1% 1.0  
Insurance & banking services   0% 0% 0% 1.0  
Other business services   -1% -1% -1% 1.0  
Med serv   -2% -2% -2% 1.0  
Oth serv   -2% -2% -2% 1.0  
Gen govt   -2% -2% -1% 1.0  
Notes: See figure above.  Export taxes include estimates of the DCC, IRCC and 470.03. We use the 
average import penetration ratio for the sector to identify the domestic content of imports. This may bias 
our measure of export taxes upwards as exporters may use a more import intensive production structure 
than the average for the sector. 
 
Export Taxes. The existence of tariffs on inputs also means that exports are inadvertently taxed. 
South Africa, does however, make provision for duty drawbacks and rebates for exporters under 
various different schemes such as the 470.03 scheme (under Schedule No. 4) and item 521 (under 
Schedule No. 5). These rebates and drawbacks are only granted where the inputs are directly used 
and not where they are embodied in domestic products. Inevitably this gives rise to a process that 
is both bureaucratic and cumbersome and only partially compensatory for the cost raising impact 
of tariffs. 
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 SA also offers two major sector specific export incentives. Under the Motor Industry 
Development Programme (MIDP), exporters of autos and auto components earn an Import 
Rebate Credit Certificate (IRCC) based on the local value of the exports. This can either be traded 
or used to rebate duties on imported components or fully assembled vehicles (Kaplan, 2003). 
Given the high tariffs on components and vehicles, these IRCCs are a significant incentive for 
auto export production (Flatters, 2002). The second export incentive is provided to clothing and 
textile exporters under the Duty Credit Certificate Scheme (DCCS), although this has been 
replaced by the interim Textile and Clothing Industry Development Programme (TCIDP). The 
DCCS allowed firms to claim a rebate on duty for proven exports. As outlined in Kaplan (2003), 
the level of support depends on the product exported – with highest support for clothing followed 
by fabric and then yarn.11  
Despite these rebates, our estimates indicate that tariff protection continues to tax export 
production. Relatively high implicit export taxes (tariff costs as percent of world value added) are 
found on leather products (29 percent), footwear (18 percent), food (15 percent) and textiles (10 
percent) (see table 3 above). The export incentives provided to autos, however, more than 
compensate for the tariff on inputs leading to a net subsidy of 14 percent of value added 
(measured at world prices) for that sector. But even in this case, high effective rates of protection 
mean that production for the domestic market remains more profitable than production for the 
export market (Figure 4). Indices of the anti-export bias, which measure the profitability of 
production for the domestic market relative to the export market, exceed 1 for almost all sectors. 
In manufacturing, production of final consumer goods for the domestic market is on average 46 
percent more profitable than production for the export market.  
                                                 
11 Firms that exported more than 15 percent of their turnover received greater support. See Kaplan 
(2003) for a detailed discussion on the various limitations of the DCCS. 
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Figure 4: Anti-export bias by end-use classification, 2006 
Anti-export bias by end-use and sector
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Notes: The anti-export bias is measured as (1+ERP)/(1+export tax). Values greater than 1 indicate that 
production for the domestic market is more profitable than production for the export market. Export values 
in 2002, as provided by the SU table, are used as weights. 
 There are further limitations regarding the use of duty rebates as a mechanism to offset 
the cost raising effects of tariffs on production. As noted above, high effective rates of protection 
in most sectors continue to stimulate production for the domestic rather than export market. We 
found evidence of this in Edwards and Lawrence (2006) where nominal tariffs and effective rates 
of protection are shown to reduce export orientation in South African manufacturing industries.  
The 470.03 rebates and 521 drawbacks are also most beneficial to large firms that import a high 
proportion of their inputs. However, even for these firms the administrative burdens are high as 
they are required to import the inputs themselves and ensure a clear audit trail which often 
requires storage in separate warehouses. For firms that are more reliant on domestic inputs or that 
purchase imported intermediate goods from retail agents, tariffs continue to discourage exports.  
Rebates also create an incentive not to use domestically produced inputs in exports. The rebates 
thus inhibit the development of local supply chains linking domestic producers of intermediate 
inputs to exporters. This is also a problem with export processing zones. The implications of this 
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are weaker upstream linkages between export producers and their input suppliers and hence lower 
multiplier effects from export growth.  
Table 4: US Imports From Lesotho (1,000 dollars) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
2006 (to 
April)
2007 (to 
April)
AGOA (excluding 
GSP) 0 129,523 317,803 372,544 447,622 388,344 384,452 113,268 129,053
No program claimed 140,150 87,573 3,446 20,382 19,244 14,887 23,816 2,593 14,540
Total 140,150 217,096 321,249 392,926 466,866 403,231 408,268 115,861 143,593
 
 If there was ever an experience that demonstrates the importance of input tariffs on inputs 
in retarding exports it is that of Lesotho responding to the benefits of AGOA. Lesotho is able to 
sell competitively in the United States, with its exports not only growing rapidly but also showing 
some resilience in 2007 after adjusting to the end of the MFA (Multi-fiber Arrangement) at the 
start of 2005. Yet Lesotho has not matched this performance in garment sales to South Africa. 
What explains the difference? It is not the degree of preference on the products since South 
Africa’s clothing tariffs are higher than those of the United States (which are typically around 17 
percent). Instead it is the different treatment of inputs.  If Lesotho wants to compete within SACU 
it has to pay the tariffs in its inputs or buy domestic inputs whose prices are raised by tariffs. But 
this is not the case for its exports to the USA.  Under AGOA conditions, Lesotho is treated as a 
"lesser developed beneficiary country".  In addition to the other preferential terms available under 
AGOA, Lesotho receives duty-free access for clothing wholly assembled in Lesotho, regardless
of the country of origin of the fabric used.12 This has been a considerable benefit to Lesotho 
which, because of existing investment from South Africa and Asian sources, is well poised to 
take advantage of these provisions.13 This suggests that if garment producers in Lesotho or the 
                                                 
12 There is a general limitation of the "applicable percentage" of the aggregate square metre 
equivalents of all apparel articles imported into the United States in the preceding 12-month period for 
which data are available Under AGOA II legislation, the cap has been doubled; see AGOA online 
information.  Available at:  http://www.agoa.gov/About_AGOA/AGOII_summary.pdf.   
13 All the factories operating in Lesotho are "cut, make and trim" operations; other aspects, from 
design to finance, are dealt with in the overseas head offices. 
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rest of SACU were given similar access to fabric inputs at world prices, they could be far more 
competitive. 
Complexity. The schedule also remains very complex. As of 2007 there were still 78 different ad 
valorem rates and 119 specific and mixed duties, for a total of 154 different rates. There remain a 
fairly large number of tariffs (7 percent of all lines) with rates between 0 and 5 percent. These are 
so-called nuisance tariffs that could surely be eliminated without significantly reducing 
protection.
Table 5: Indicators of tariff complexity 
 2006  2007 
 MFN EU SADC Total  MFN EU EFTA SADC Total 
tariff type           
advalorem 6,478 6,517 6,669 19,664  6,249 6,289 6,261 6,416 25,215
specific 103 65 2 170  85 47 73 2 207
specific max 24 38 0 62  26 28 26 0 80
mixed 63 48 2 113  55 51 55 2 163
formula 5 5 0 10  5 5 5 0 15
TOTAL 6,673 6,673 6,673 20,019  6,420 6,420 6,420 6,420 25,680
Percent           
advalorem 97% 98% 100% 98%  97% 98% 98% 100% 98%
specific 2% 1% 0% 1%  1% 1% 1% 0% 1%
specific max 0% 1% 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
mixed 1% 1% 0% 1%  1% 1% 1% 0% 1%
formula 0% 0% 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
           
Number of 
rates           
TOTAL 100 95 9 150  90 88 106 8 154
Ad valorem 38 37 6 58  36 43 52 5 78
Other 62 58 3 92  54 45 54 3 76
 
 South Africa’s tariff schedule also remains relatively complex compared to other upper 
middle income economies. Figure 5 below presents various indicators of the 2006 tariff schedule 
for South Africa, upper middle income economies and the world. The data are sourced from the 
World Tariff Profiles 2006 report and the simple average for the country groups is calculated. The 
ascending rank of South Africa in the full sample of countries (147 in most cases) is also 
presented above the bars. 
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Figure 5: International comparison of SACU tariffs 
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Source: World Tariff Profiles 2006.  
Notes:  International tariff peaks are defined as those exceeding 15 percent. Nuisance rates are those greater 
than zero, but less than or equal to 2 percent. 
 SA is similar to other upper middle income economies in terms of its average rate 
binding coverage. The similar averages, however, hide a considerably larger proportion of duty-
free lines in South Africa compared to the average for upper middle income economies (57 
percent vs. 26 percent), implying that the average non-zero tariff is relatively high in South 
Africa. A similar proportion of tariff lines have tariffs in excess of 15 percent (international tariff 
peaks), but South Africa has double the proportion of domestic spikes (percentage lines with 
tariffs greater than 3 times the average rate). Compared to the full sample of 147 countries, South 
Africa has the 10th highest proportion of domestic spikes. In addition, South Africa tends to have 
a relatively large number of distinct duty rates (including ad valorem equivalent rates).14 Overall, 
this leads to a relatively large coefficient of variation for the South African tariff schedule in 
2006. 
                                                 
14 Equivalent specific duties (e.g. 5c/kg) will have different ad valorem rates if the international 
price differs across products. 
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Section 2: Is the current tariff structure justifiable? 
As we have shown, the current tariff structure continues to provide considerable 
protection for some sectors.  It also discourages exports, is still complex and quite opaque. But 
perhaps the structure can be rationalized and the protection and complexity justified. For 
example, tariffs might provide job protection in a reasonably efficient manner or they could 
nurture infant industries, alleviate poverty, or provide income support for less-skilled workers. If 
one or more of these goals were being accomplished, then the protection and complexity we have 
found might still be merited. In fact, we come to precisely the opposite conclusion. While the 
current structure does support some jobs at relatively low costs, many tariffs preserve jobs at a 
considerable cost to consumers. This is significant because as we will show the incidence of 
tariffs is regressive.  We also find that infant industry considerations cannot explain the current 
tariff structure which for the most part appears to reflect a preservationist rather than a strategic 
orientation.  
 In order to consider the costs and potential benefits of current protection, we develop a 
partial equilibrium framework. This should be born in mind since it means we are actually 
measuring the initial impact effects of tariff reductions on employment rather than long run, 
general equilibrium effects. Since liberalization would induce a decline in the trade balance it 
would also be likely to induce a weaker exchange rate. That in turn would stimulate exports and 
reduce imports, thereby providing an offsetting increase to employment.  Similarly, the job loss 
numbers we estimate are upper bounds of the number of workers who would actually be rendered 
unemployed, since to some degree employment could be reduced through normal voluntary 
attrition. On the other side of the ledger though is the consideration that the adjustment costs of 
dislocation and unemployment are not explicitly accounted for in the net social welfare 
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calculations. In the US literature (.e.g. Magee (1972) and  Baldwin & Richardson)(1980))  these 
have been found to be far less than the net welfare gains, but given the current South African rate 
of unemployment such costs could be significantly higher. 15   
 On the import side we use disaggregated import demand elasticities for South Africa that 
are derived from Kee et al. (2006). Since we assume goods are homogeneous, we know that the 
import demand elasticity measure is actually an excess demand elasticity reflecting both domestic 
demand and supply. We therefore decompose the import elasticities into demand and supply 
responses. We ensure consistency with these import demand elasticities by assuming that the 
elasticity of supply = – 0.5 elasticity of demand.  
 We make another innovation. Most similar studies of the costs of protection ignore the 
effects on exports. However, we make some effort to include this effect. Exports are modelled as 
a function of value added. Hence changes in exports are estimated by calculating the reduction in 
the tariffs on intermediate inputs arising from tariff liberalisation. Assumed export supply 
responses are -0.4 per unit change in export tax for manufacturing and agriculture and -0.1 for 
mining.  16  
 Finally, we also include non-government services. To model the effect of liberalisation 
on services, we impose the assumption that output prices are fixed (the Balassa assumption in 
calculating ERP) and assume a supply elasticity equal to two thirds of the average for all traded 
sectors. We are purposefully conservative in our treatment of services as we do not wish this 
                                                 
15 Magee (1972) found that the (static) benefits from removing all US trade restrictions in 1971 
over a five year period would be 100 times greater than the wages that would be lost during the transitional 
unemployment required for displaced workers to find new jobs.  Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson (1980) 
undertook a similar, but more inclusive analysis that took account of capital adjustment costs and found 
that the gains from trade liberalization were some 20 times greater than adjustment costs.  In South Africa, 
the low employment rate implies that a large number of individuals are supported by each worker. At the 
same time, poor households are primarily dependent on government transfers and income from services 
sectors and not income from protected sectors. The poor may therefore derive greater proportionate benefits 
from cheaper goods. 
16 The -0.4 coefficient is taken from Edwards and Lawrence (2006). 
 24
sector to dominate results. The implication is that we under-estimate the positive impact of 
liberalisation on employment and output in these sectors. Our estimates are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6: Estimated welfare effect of liberalising protected sectors 
 
Change in 
imports 
(%) 
Change in 
exports 
(%) 
Change in 
domestic 
supply 
(import 
competing) 
(%) 
Change in 
employment 
(number) 
Consumer 
surplus 
gain/job 
(R'000) 
Tariff 
revenue 
loss (Rm)
Net 
national 
welfare 
gain (Rm) 
Net national 
welfare 
gain/output 
(%) 
Agriculture 3.2% 1.3% -0.1% 921 1 101 4 0.0% 
Coal mining -0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 57 0 0 0 0.0% 
Gold & Plat 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 167 0 0 0 0.0% 
Other mining 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 93 0 1 0 0.0% 
Food 12.7% 6.6% -1.0% -987 75 1,228 115 0.1% 
Beverages 1.7% 2.6% 0.0% 94 21 56 2 0.0% 
Tobacco 64.2% 1.9% -0.8% -13 664 29 13 0.1% 
Textiles 20.5% 4.3% -5.1% -2,056 31 705 92 0.5% 
Clothing 36.2% -1.7% -13.0% -9,395 78 1,548 556 4.3% 
Leather prods 7.3% 14.4% -2.0% 222 35 250 16 0.4% 
Footwear 19.7% 8.5% -12.2% -1,262 162 1,196 132 4.3% 
Wood & prods 3.4% 2.1% -0.2% 11 1 80 1 0.0% 
Paper & prods 2.7% 2.5% -0.2% 50 9 176 7 0.0% 
Printing 2.2% 1.3% -0.2% -104 0 40 1 0.0% 
Petrol ref 0.5% 0.3% 0.0% 0 8 1 0 0.0% 
Basic chems 1.1% 1.3% -0.2% 23 1 290 1 0.0% 
Other chems 0.9% 2.7% -0.1% 52 12 401 2 0.0% 
Rubber prods 7.8% 2.9% -2.7% -281 21 508 15 0.2% 
Plastic prods 8.5% 3.3% -0.8% -222 2 499 9 0.0% 
Glass & prods 7.0% 2.0% -1.0% -79 1 90 2 0.0% 
Non-met mins 6.9% 1.0% -0.9% -447 2 288 7 0.0% 
Bas iron & st 1.5% 1.6% -0.1% 350 0 33 3 0.0% 
Bas n-fer met 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 24 0 51 0 0.0% 
Metal prods 5.4% 2.2% -0.7% -382 1 491 9 0.0% 
Machinery 0.2% 1.8% 0.7% 996 3 726 15 0.0% 
Electr mach 4.5% 3.2% -1.1% -302 14 637 15 0.0% 
Tv & coms eq 1.8% 1.0% -0.9% -61 56 183 15 0.2% 
Scientific eq -0.2% 1.4% 1.3% 122 0 15 0 0.0% 
Motveh & parts 23.6% -5.0% -10.2% -12,458 89 7,572 1,546 1.2% 
Oth trnsp eq -0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 39 2 45 0 0.0% 
Furniture 10.7% 3.0% -2.2% -395 30 354 28 0.2% 
Other manufacturing 2.7% 1.6% -0.3% 0 12 256 8 0.0% 
         
All sectors (excl gov) 6.5% 0.6% -0.5% -20,426 6 17,850 2,625 0.1% 
Traded sectors 6.5% 0.6% -1.5% -25,223 17 17,850 2,613 0.2% 
Manufacturing 7.8% 0.9% -1.8% -26,461 31 17,748 2,609 0.2% 
    excl vehicles 3.7% 2.0% -0.7% -14,003 25 10,176 1,063 0.1% 
Notes:  
x All data are for 2006. Output and employment data are sourced from Quantec. 
x The 27% import rebate granted to producers of vehicles is included in estimates of the ERP. The 
DCC and IRCC are included in estimates of the export tax for vehicles and clothing & textiles. 
The rebates granted under 470.02 and 521 are calculated assuming a zero tariff on imported 
content of exports. Imported content is estimated using the average import penetration ratio for 
each sector 
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 The overall distortion to the economy as share of domestic production of traded goods 
(agriculture, mining and manufacturing) is 0.2 percent. Given the ratio of GDP/Gross output for 
these sectors is approx 31 percent, this implies that the deadweight loss is approx 0.65 percent of 
GDP in agriculture, mining and manufacturing or approximately 0.22 percent of total GDP. 
Taking this perspective suggests that trade protection does have significant effects but these do 
not appear to be sufficiently large enough for the static (efficiency) effects of liberalization to 
provide a very strong boost to incomes. Nonetheless, looking more closely at the individual 
industry estimates indicates some distortions that are relatively large. In particular, the largest 
deadweight distortions are in the clothing (4.3 percent of output) footwear (4.3 percent) and 
motor vehicles (1.2 percent) sectors.  
Table 7: Estimated direct employment effects of liberalisation 
 
Change in 
Domestic 
productio
n (Rm) 
Total 
change in 
employment
Due to: 
Household 
consumption
Due to: 
Intermedi
ate and 
capital 
goods 
Due to: 
Exports
Total 
change 
employ
ment 
(%) 
Gain/loss
Revealed 
Comparative 
Advantage, 
2006 
Agriculture 108 921 -340 -130 1,391 0.1% Gain 0.3 
Coal mining 41 57 0 8 49 0.1% Gain 0.8 
Gold & Plat 38 167 0 0 167 0.1% Gain 1.0 
Other mining 62 93 0 0 93 0.0% Gain 0.2 
Food -771 -987 -1,361 -233 607 -0.6% Loss -0.3 
Beverages 97 94 -2 -7 104 0.2% Gain 0.3 
Tobacco -52 -13 -20 0 7 -0.5% Loss 0.7 
Textiles -770 -2,056 -940 -1,293 178 -4.3% Loss -0.5 
Clothing -1,598 -9,395 -8,488 -829 -77 -12.3% Loss -0.8 
Leather prods 120 222 -87 -26 335 2.8% Gain 0.0 
Footwear -365 -1,262 -1,318 41 15 -11.9% Loss -1.0 
Wood & prods 4 11 -7 -97 115 0.0% Gain -0.1 
Paper & prods 60 50 -31 -33 114 0.1% Gain 0.0 
Printing -42 -104 14 -134 16 -0.2% Loss -0.8 
Petrol ref 0 0 -2 -3 5 0.0% Gain -0.1 
Basic chems 77 23 0 -38 61 0.1% Gain -0.1 
Other chems 85 52 -11 -23 85 0.1% Gain -0.6 
Rubber prods -184 -281 -64 -273 56 -2.0% Loss -0.5 
Plastic prods -154 -222 -8 -282 68 -0.6% Loss -0.5 
Glass & prods -51 -79 -1 -91 13 -0.8% Loss -0.5 
Non-met mins -183 -447 -33 -454 40 -0.7% Loss -0.5 
Bas iron & st 627 350 0 -44 393 0.7% Gain 0.7 
Bas n-fer met 36 24 0 0 24 0.1% Gain 0.2 
Metal prods -153 -382 -55 -684 357 -0.3% Loss -0.1 
Machinery 412 996 -165 740 422 0.9% Gain -0.5 
Electr mach -235 -302 -126 -286 110 -0.7% Loss -0.6 
Tv & coms eq -55 -61 -75 6 8 -0.7% Loss -0.8 
Scientific eq 51 122 45 62 14 1.3% Gain -0.8 
Motveh & parts -11,986 -12,458 -2,996 -8,153 -1,309 -9.2% Loss -0.4 
Oth trnsp eq 36 39 -7 43 3 0.3% Gain -0.7 
Furniture -114 -395 -409 -259 273 -1.0% Loss 0.0 
Other manuf 0 0 -141 -34 175 0.0% Gain -0.3 
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All sectors (excl gov) -12,933 -20,426    -0.3%   
Traded sectors -14,856 -25,223 -16,628 -12,504 3,909 -1.0%   
Manufacturing -15,105 -26,461 -16,289 -12,381 2,209 -2.0%   
     excl vehicles -3,119 -14,003 -13,293 -4,229 3,518 -1.2%   
 Note: Exports declined in the case of motor vehicles as lower tariffs reduce the implicit export 
subsidy provided under the MIDP in the form of IRCC. Similarly, growth in exports of clothing and textiles 
are tempered by the lower value of the Duty Credits when tariffs are reduced to zero. Revealed comparative 
advantage is calculated as (exports – imports)/(exports + imports), i.e. a value greater than zero identifies a 
comparative advantage. 
 
What about employment? As would be expected, the overall impact effect of removing 
tariffs on employment in traded sectors is negative. This is primarily attributed to the declines in 
employment in Motor vehicles and parts (12,458 jobs), clothing (9,395) textiles (2,056) and 
footwear (1,262). The net overall effect is a decline in employment in traded sectors of 1 percent, 
i.e. 25 thousand jobs.   
At the sector level, however, liberalization can also increase employment by raising 
output via three avenues: Firstly, through improving profitability and raising output in sectors in 
which effective rates of protection are increased. And secondly, through improving export 
profitability and boosting exports through a reduction in anti-export bias.  The third avenue is 
through growth in services in response to lower input costs. We find that employment does 
increase in 15 of the 32 traded sectors in our sample, most of which are export oriented sectors.  
In addition to an increase in employment in agriculture and mining there are gains, amongst 
others, in beverages, leather products, iron and steel and scientific equipment. Interestingly 
exports are boosted strongly in leather products, (14.4 percent) footwear (8.5 percent) and food 
(6.6 percent). Finally, we estimate a rise in employment in non-governmental services of around 
5,000. 
 Another way of looking at this issue is to focus on the redistribution from consumers to 
producers. In this regard an illuminating perspective is how much consumers pay per job under 
current protection.  The answer, in some sectors is a very large amount, particularly when 
compared to the average take home pay of workers in manufacturing of 95 thousand rand.  The 
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most startling are the costs paid by consumers to for each and every job in Tobacco (R664 
thousand) and footwear (R162 thousand). Note that these values reflect the consumer surplus 
transferred per job in the entire industry, i.e. in the production of inputs, final goods and exports. 
The transfers close to triple if we look at the transfer per employee in the final goods sector. 
There are also very high costs for consumers per job in Motor vehicles (R89,000), TV and 
communications equipment ( R56,000), Clothing (R78,000) and Food (R75,000). Also striking is 
the variance in these costs. Even though on average consumers pay  R31,000 per manufacturing 
job, it is clearly not the case that trying to save jobs in a relatively efficient manner is something 
that is achieved by the current tariff structure.  
 The cost to society is starker if we focus on the net national welfare gains and consumer 
gains per job lost (Figure 6). If we focus on the results for all sectors (excluding government 
services), the current tariff structure reduces national welfare by R129 thousand per job saved. 
The cost per consumer is an astounding R2 million per job saved.  
Figure 6: Welfare gains per job lost from elimination of tariff protection 
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 If there was to be complete liberalization, the largest Rand value boost to consumer 
welfare would occur from liberalizing motor vehicles and food products. Indeed, the results in 
Figure 7 which present the distribution of consumer surplus gain from eliminating tariff barriers, 
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clearly show that the bulk of the distortions to consumers are located in a few sectors. In the 
figure, the cumulative gain in consumer surplus is presented on the Y-axis, while the level of 
protection on final consumer goods is provided on the X-axis. Removal of tariffs on motor 
vehicles and food products have the largest impact on consumer welfare and each sector accounts 
for 28 percent of the overall consumer surplus gain. This is followed by clothing (14 percent). 71 
percent of the consumer surplus gain from the elimination of tariff barriers is accounted for by 
these three sectors alone. 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of consumer surplus gain from eliminating tariff barriers 
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 In sum, the current tariffs serve to preserve some jobs in particular sectors, but they do so 
at a cost to society at large and at a considerable cost to consumers.  It is also of interest to 
consider who those consumers are. There are two factors that need to be taken into account. First, 
what share of their overall incomes do consumers at different income levels spend on tradable 
goods? and second, what tariff rates are charged on the particular goods bought by consumers at 
different income levels? It turns out that the dominant effects of the tariff structure on income 
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distribution operate through the first effect. That is, the poor spend the majority of their income 
on tradable goods, while those in wealthier deciles spend proportionately more on services that 
are not subject to tariffs. In particular, tradable goods such as food, alcohol and tobacco account 
for over 40 percent of household expenditure for households in the lowest three deciles and if we 
include primary agriculture, this share rises to just over 50 percent (Table 8). In general, this also 
means that tariffs on tradable products and particularly food products fall disproportionately on 
poor households.   
 A second effect occurs through differences in the tariff rates charged on goods consumed 
at different income levels. In 2004 the weighted average tariff ranged from 8 percent to 9 percent 
for the top (richest) 5 deciles, but then fell to less than 5 percent for the bottom. Wealthy 
households tend to consume relatively highly protected products, particularly motor vehicles for 
which the tariff averages 31 percent. The relatively low average tariff on traded goods consumed 
by poor households arises from the relatively low tariffs on agricultural products and grain mills 
products, which account for close to 20 percent of expenditure by poor households. The key 
consumption products maize flour and poultry have zero or close to zero tariffs. The two effects 
are illustrated in Figure 8 below: The average tariff on traded goods rises with each decile, but 
tariffs account for higher shares of spending on all products (i.e. both goods and services) for the 
poor. 
Figure 8: Expenditure weighted average tariff by decile 
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Table 8: Top consumption products of poor households (Decile 1 & 2) and wealthy 
households (Decile 9 & 10) 
 Poor households Wealthy households 
Sector
Share 
expenditu
re Tariff 
Max 
tariff Sector 
Share 
expendit
ure Tariff 
Max 
tariff 
Agricultural products 10% 6% 44% Motor vehicles 4% 31% 32%
Meat products 9% 22% 108% Petroleum products 3% 0% 20%
Grain mill products 9% 0% 25% Meat products 3% 22% 108%
Soap products 8% 14% 20% Beverages & tobacco 2% 4% 25%
Bakery products 6% 13% 25% Soap products 2% 14% 20%
Sugar products 5% 0% 0% Wearing apparel 2% 37% 40%
Other food products 4% 14% 30% Agricultural products 2% 6% 44%
Wearing apparel 3% 37% 40% Dairy products 1% 21% 42%
Petroleum products 3% 0% 20% Other food products 1% 14% 30%
Dairy products 3% 21% 42% Bakery products 1% 13% 25%
Beverages & tobacco 3% 4% 25% Furniture 1% 18% 20%
Oils & fats products 2% 8% 10% Footwear 1% 29% 32%
Footwear 2% 29% 32% Publish & print prods 1% 1% 15%
Other manufacturing 2% 5% 30% Grain mill products 1% 0% 25%
Other paper products 1% 17% 20% Radio & television 1% 9% 25%
Fish products 1% 2% 30% Fruit & vegetables 1% 9% 55%
Fruit & vegetables 1% 9% 55% Household appliances 1% 13% 30%
Knitting mill products 0% 35% 40% Other paper products 1% 17% 20%
Furniture 0% 18% 20% Fish products 1% 2% 30%
Note: The tariffs are the import weighted average tariff on final goods. Expenditure shares are calculated 
using the IES 2000 survey. 
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 Figure 9 below shows an approximate Lorenz curve based on the cumulative value of 
total expenditure in 2000 for each of 10 deciles, ordered sequentially in increments of 10. A 
concentration curve using the tariff incidence data for 2006 is also constructed.  The 
concentration curve of tariff expenditure lies above the expenditure Lorenz curve for all income 
deciles. This shows that import tariffs are a regressive tax and poor household bear a 
disproportionate share of the tariff burden relative to their income. For example, households in 
the poorest 2 deciles account for 1.6 percent of total expenditure, but 2.5 percent of the implicit 
tariff revenue. Households in the first 5 deciles account for 7.8 percent of total expenditure, but 
12.4 percent of the implicit tariff revenue. 
Figure 9: Cumulative distributions of expenditure and costs of tariff protection 
Cumulative distributions of expenditure and implicit tariff 
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Note: See Daniels and Edwards (2007) for methodology 
 Infant industry protection. Often protection is justified on infant industry grounds.   
The idea is that protection will nurture and stimulate production capabilities.  The aim of infant 
industry protection is to encourage the production of products that have particularly desirable 
strategic characteristics so that the costs of protection today will be more than offset by the 
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benefits that will accrue over time. One possibility is that protection today is being granted to 
develop exports that are particularly associated with relatively rapid economic growth. A second 
possibility is that protection will improve South Africa’s potential to develop exports in related 
products in the future. In this section we use some measures of productive potential developed by 
Hausmann and Klinger (2006) to evaluate if protection is geared towards these goals.  
 The first measured is PRODY, which is an indicator of revealed product sophistication. 
This is calculated as the weighted average of the GDP per capita of each country that exports a 
particular product. Research using this variable has found that higher PRODY goods are 
associated with greater subsequent growth and successful countries such as China are 
distinguished by their specialization in exports that have a higher PRODY than their current 
income levels. (Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006) and Rodrik (2006). The second measure is 
“density”. Hausmann and Klinger developed this measure to indicate how close any product not 
currently being exported is to the current export basket. If a sector has a high density then, given 
existing exports, it will be relatively to easy to become an exporter of this product, For example if 
a country is already an exporter of shirts it could be easy for it  to become an exporter of skirts. 
The third measure is strategic value. This is a measure of the marginal contribution of exporting 
this product to new export possibilities. In other words if a country exports a product with a high 
strategic value (say autoparts) it will be more likely to export a lot of other products (e.g. 
automobiles, machinery etc).  
 Tradeoffs may of course exist between these measures: sectors in which it is easy to 
attain a comparative advantage in (have a high density) may have low strategic value or a low 
PRODY. Indeed, the relatively low and stagnant export sophistication for South Africa in the 
1970s, 1980s and early 1990s reflected the failure of SA to shift from peripheral products to those 
with high strategic value (Klinger and Hausman, 1996 – SA study).  
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 We use these three measures to assess the extent to which tariff protection in 2006 may 
facilitate or impede structural transformation of South Africa’s export bundle. To analyse the 
relationships, we aggregate, using import values, the various measures of productive capabilities, 
which are available at the HS4-digit level, to 32 industrial sectors (ISIC 3/4 digit level), made up 
of 4 primary sectors and 28 manufacturing sectors. Nominal tariffs are drawn from the 2006 June 
tariff schedule for SACU and include ad valorem equivalents.17 Estimates of effective protection, 
the implicit export tax and the anti-export bias are calculated using an aggregated 2002 Supply-
Use table obtained from Statistics SA (2005). Estimates are adjusted for rebates under the Duty 
Credit Certificate Programme (Clothing and textiles), the IRCC (motor industry) and the 470.03 
scheme.  
 Overall, we find a wide variation in the association between the measures of productive 
capabilities and protection. Very little of the variation is explained by a linear trend fitted to the 
data. The scatter plots in the figures below generally slope downwards, suggesting that both 
nominal tariff protection and effective rates of protection are relatively high in sectors with low 
PRODY, strategic value (to a lesser extent) and density. This means that the sectors that are 
being given protection are not those which are likely to enhance competitive capabilities in the 
future.  A somewhat more favourable picture of the structure emerges only in case of export 
taxes. Export taxes (large negative reflect high implicit export tax) are however, relatively low in 
sectors with high PRODY and density. The structure of tariff protection therefore does not appear 
to impede export growth of these sectors relative to those with low PRODY and density values.   
 Conclusion: All in all, we find that the tariff structure remains quite protectionist, 
discouraging of exports and complex and opaque. It does not appear to be a cost effective 
approach to job preservation, it has a regressive impact on income distribution and it does not 
appear to reflect a coherent infant industry orientation .Instead, it is poorly focused and clearly 
                                                 
17 Calculated using 2006 import prices.  
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the result of numerous ad hoc decisions based on historical and political pressures rather that 
strategic behaviour.   
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 Is Simpler Really Better? We will demonstrate in the next section that an approach in 
which the majority of tariff lines are set either at zero or at only one or two rates and is 
supplemented by safeguard, infant industry, and unfair trade exceptions -- is likely to be far 
superior to current practice which continues to rely on a highly differentiated structure that is 
poorly grounded. Some object that in seeking to judge the overall performance of the tariff 
structure by these criteria we are overlooking the argument that it is necessary to have a highly 
differentiated tariff structure to provide scope for the authorities to grant individual producers the 
amount of protection they require in order to become competitive.  
 We find this argument unconvincing both in terms of the economic logic it reflects as 
well as the administrative burdens that it imposes.  Indeed, a case-by-case approach which sets 
individual tariffs differentially is more likely to be counterproductive, misallocate scarce 
resources in the economy and reduce South African living standards by giving the most 
protection to the activities in which South Africa is the least efficient economically and the most 
organized politically.  
 Economic Principles. Let us use the current protection of fruit as an example of the case 
by case approach. Table 9 presents information on the tariff rates applied to various fruit products 
as well as a measure of Revealed Comparative Advantage. (RCA). We measure RCA as exports-
imports over exports plus imports. This ranges from 1 (only exports) to -1 (only imports). Values 
in excess of 0 reveal a comparative advantage in production of the product.  
  South African tariffs for fruit range widely from the 35 percent for mangoes, to 15 
percent for Pineapples, melons and, strawberries, 10 percent for dried grapes, 5 percent for most 
other fruits (e.g. bananas, oranges, grapes, pears, and peaches) and zero for several berries, dates 
and figs: Secondly, there is very little change in tariff protection over the entire period. Protection 
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has remained unchanged for up to 11 years and more for most of the products. And thirdly there 
is no consistent relationship between competitiveness and the tariff structure. 
 What could possibly justify such a structure? One argument is that absent protection it is 
less profitable to grow mangoes in South Africa for example than to grow pears and so in order to 
survive so that they can eventually become competitive mango producers should be given more 
protection than pear producers. The tariffs therefore “level the playing field” between South 
African farmers and their foreign competitors and they do so by setting tariffs equal to the 
difference between the border price of imports and the domestic farm-gate price.  
 But when left in place for long periods of time, this approach rewards inefficiency and 
guarantees that protection will be very costly. The least efficient sectors get the most protection. 
This raises the key question: why should the South African government stimulate the production 
of a fruit in which South Africa is less competitive and provide less support for fruits in which it 
is more competitive? The basic point is that protection channels resources out of some activities 
into others. By imposing these tariffs, the Government is creating incentives to put more South 
African farmland, capital investments, farm labor, water and fertilizers etc. into mango growing 
and less into growing other fruit.  Over long periods of time, maintaining this structure is surely 
counterproductive.  If growing pears is a more profitable and competitive activity than growing 
mangoes, resources should be moving into pear production and away from mangos.  It is one 
thing to argue that fruit farming (or farming as a whole) should be assisted, but it is another to 
argue that some fruits deserve more help than others.  
 Moreover, there is an irony in this approach. Domestic producers actually compete with 
each other to attract investment and workers and other scarce resources.  At the same time as the 
government tries to level the playing field between domestic and foreign producers it actually 
slants the playing field towards domestic mango producers and away from other domestic fruit 
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producers! Surely a level playing field at home is even more important than one internationally. 
Yet a differentiated tariff structure actually does the opposite! It places the government in a 
position of favoring some South African producers at the expense of others.  
 So far we have only considered farmers.  But tariffs also affect other producers who use 
fruit as an input. In addition to the protection they provide to some producers, differentiated 
tariffs have consequences. They could also tilt the playing field downstream.  Why would the 
government want to favor producers wishing to process pears (by giving it a low tariff) and to 
penalize producers wishing to process mangoes (by raising its domestic price)?  
 It is striking that South Africa retains tariffs on fruits that it exports. As shown by the 
measures of revealed comparative advantage in the Table 9, South Africa is an exporter of 
oranges and many other fruits. (RCA = 1).18 This means that SA farmers producing these fruits 
are actually internationally competitive. Why if this is the case, are these fruits (pears, grapes, 
oranges etc) being given any protection at all? If the domestic South African markets for fruit are 
competitive, the prices of fruits that South Africa exports will be lower at home they are on world 
markets and though it does not impose costs on consumers, protection is unnecessary. But if 
domestic producers actually have market power at can engage in import-parity pricing, protection 
harms fruit processors by raising domestic prices above world levels.  
In other work for this project we have expressed some reservations about encouraging 
beneficiation as a guide for policy, but it’s hard to explain a policy that would actually discourage 
beneficiation.19 Why impose tariffs on a key input (pears, peaches etc) and raise the costs of the 
canning industry in South Africa -- an important potential export? Why impose tariffs on grapes 
                                                 
18 Positive tariffs are applied on over 50 percent of all HS 8-digit products that are internationally 
competitive, as indicated by positive RCAs. Statistical tests show that competitive products are as likely to 
have a positive tariff as uncompetitive products and there are no differences in the predicted level of 
protection. In other words, we find no consistent or coherent relationship between tariff protection and 
competitiveness. 
19 See  Hausmann, Klinger and Lawrence. 
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and thereby raise the costs of South African wine exporters?  And finally, in general tariffs raise 
the prices that consumers have to pay for fruit. Higher fruit prices may well be a necessary evil to 
support fruit farmers, but the differentiated tariff additionally distorts the choices of consumers 
between fruits:  Why would the government actually want to discourage the consumption of 
mangoes and encourage the consumption of Apples?   
 Administrative challenges. To implement a highly differentiated approach to tariffs in 
practice, the government has to be able to (a) adequately identify and assess the economic merits 
of each product’s need for protection; (b) have appropriate instruments at its disposal to provide 
the needed protection in the correct amounts and (c) be able to withdraw the protection once 
industries actually become competitive. It is one thing to try to accomplish this in a few selective 
cases and quite another to claim that it can be done line by line across the board. 
 First, the government simply does not have detailed knowledge of production and 
consumption of over 6000 product lines, and to the extent that it actually scrutinizes the existing 
tariffs, it has to rely heavily on data and arguments provided by the industries themselves. This 
informational asymmetry makes it highly susceptible to capture. It is one thing to claim to be able 
to obtain such knowledge in a few select cases or for a few broad categories and quite another to 
be able to do it product by product. In opening itself up to setting highly differentiated rates, the 
government is likely to be vulnerable to rent seeking and capture.    
 Second, in a volatile world the “necessary” tariff differential is unlikely to remain 
constant, so that even if the different rates were appropriate to achieve the desired effect at one 
point in time, they would have to be continuously changed to maintain that effect.  Yet this would 
be administratively burdensome and unrealistic. And finally, instances in which the government 
has actually reduced individual tariffs on its own are rare. This means, for example, that 
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industries that made a case for a particular level of protection when import prices were low or the 
Rand was strong, benefit differentially when conditions change.    
 In sum, tariffs reallocate resources towards producing more of the product that is being 
protected and away from being used to produce all other products. Since they arbitrarily impose 
costs on other producers and on consumers, therefore, individual tariffs should be used sparingly 
and only with clear justification. 20 We would not rule out the use of protection at tariff rates that 
differ from the norm but would argue that where it is provided, the reasons should be explicitly 
stated and supported.  In the example above, perhaps protection could be justified as a short run 
(safeguard) measure to assist mango growers while they make the shift into more profitable fruits. 
But it should then be explicitly temporary. Alternatively, perhaps protection could be justified as 
infant industry protection, necessary to attract farmers into mango farming because the industry 
would eventually be competitive if it operated at sufficient scale. Thus both of these deviations 
from the norm are arguments for temporary protection and not current practice.  Finally, if 
foreigners subsidize their exports, tariffs that precisely offset such subsidies could be justified as 
a countervailing duty but the necessary investigations would have to be undertaken. 
Table 9: Tariff rates on fruit products and indicators of Revealed Comparative Advantage 
HS code Description  
Tariff 
95
Tariff 
00
Tariff 
06
RCA 
95
RCA 
2000 
RCA 
2006 
08030000 Bananas  5 5 5  -0.9 -0.3 -0.8
08041000 Dates  0 0 0  -0.9 -0.8 -0.1
08042000 Figs  0 0 0  -0.9 -0.7 -1.0
08043000 Pineapples  15 15 15  1.0 1.0 0.9
                                                 
20 To favour a tariff, it should be shown why (a) the resource allocation it induces will 
raise social welfare and (b) why the tariff is the best available instrument.  For example, the 
government might have to raise revenue. For this purpose sales (or value-added) taxes are 
generally superior to tariffs, but in underdeveloped countries without tax administration, customs 
revenues raised through tariffs could well be more cost effective. Similarly, a production subsidy 
could be superior to an infant industry tariff, but the government might again find that raising and 
disbursing the subsidy is too costly.  Another justification for tariffs could be that markets are 
actually imperfect. For example, as shown in Krugman and Helpman, in the face of a foreign 
monopolist with a particular demand structure, a tariff could actually shift rents away from the 
foreigner and towards the domestic producers.  
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08044000 Avocadoes  5 5 5  1.0 1.0 0.8
08045000 Mangoes  15 35 35  0.9 1.0 0.8
08051000 Oranges  5 5 5  1.0 1.0 1.0
08052000 Clementines, Mandarines  5 5 5  1.0 1.0 1.0
08053000 Lemons and limes  5 5 5  1.0 1.0 1.0
08054000 Grapefruit  5 5 5  1.0 1.0 1.0
08059000 Other Citrus  5 5 5  1.0 0.5 1.0
08061000 Fresh grapes  5 5 5  0.9 1.0 1.0
08062000 Dried grapes  0 14 10  1.0 0.9 1.0
08071100 Watermelons  15 15 15  1.0 1.0 1.0
08071900 Other melons  15 15 15  1.0 1.0 1.0
08072000 Papaws  15 15 15  0.4 1.0 0.8
08081000 Fresh apples  5 5 5  1.0 1.0 1.0
08082000 Pears and quinces  5 5 5  1.0 1.0 1.0
08091000 Apricots  5 5 5  0.9 1.0 0.9
08092000 Cherries  15 5 5  -0.2 0.6 -0.7
08093000 Peaches and nectarines  5 5 5  0.9 1.0 0.6
08094000 Plums  5 5 5  1.0 1.0 0.9
08101000 Strawberries  15 15 15  -0.3 0.9 -0.8
08102000 
Raspberries, blackberries, 
mulberries and loganberries 5 0 0  0.0 0.4 0.9
08103000 Currants and gooseberries  5 0 0  -1.0 0.8 0.7
08104000 Cranberries, bilberries  5 0 0  -1.0 1.0 1.0
08105000 Kiwifruit   5 5   -0.9 -0.9
08106000 Durians    5    -1.0
08109010 Granadillas and litchis  15 15 15  1.0 1.0 1.0
08109090 Other fresh fruit  5 5 5  -0.2 1.0 1.0
          
 
Correlation coefficient 
between tariffs and RCA 0.240 0.344 0.141     
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Section 3. Economic effects of alternative trade reform scenarios 
 
The SACU tariff structure is clearly in need of reform. One option is to simply liberalise 
unilaterally. This approach would be effective in stimulating exports as well as realising the 
economic gains and consumer welfare gains described earlier. However, the adjustment costs 
may be perceived as too high and will also be concentrated in a number of important labour 
intensive sectors including clothing. 
Is there an alternative strategy? In this section we propose an approach to trade policy reform 
that we believe will enable South Africa to realise most of the gains from liberalisation, while 
minimising the dislocation of production and employment. In particular, we propose an approach 
to tariff reform that seeks to:  
x Provide benefits to consumers, 
x Limit employment dislocation,  
x Promote exports, 
x Provides a norm against which industrial priorities can be set, and 
x Facilitate regional and multilateral trade negotiations 
The proposal. Our general strategy is to explore the use of a single (or limited number) band 
approach that is heavily focused on finished goods and that implements extensive reductions and 
eventual liberalization of capital goods and intermediate inputs. This strategy rests on three key 
ideas:  
 Firstly, concentrating on reducing input tariffs can both promote exports by reducing 
export taxes and will increase effective protection on remaining sectors. 
 Secondly, by reducing input tariffs, there may be scope to provide benefits to final 
consumers by reduce some output tariffs without reducing protection for some producers. 
 Finally, simplification of the tariff schedule reduces the burden of administering rebates, 
provides a transparent signal for resource allocation and is less open to industry lobbying 
 44
Let’s first deal with the issue of simplification. A key role of tariffs as an instrument of 
industrial policy is that they grant an incentive, through increased domestic prices, for investment 
and production in that industry.21 The effectiveness of tariffs in achieving these goals depends on 
both the level and the transparency of the signal. A tariff schedule consisting of uniform bands of 
ad valorem tariffs with significantly (in economic sense) different levels or protection is best 
suited for this purpose. Firstly, the ad valorem tariff is transparent, unlike specific or mixed tariffs 
where the level of protection varies vary according to exchange rate or international price 
fluctuations.  Secondly, distinct tariff bands that provide a sizeable level of protection provide a 
clear signal to investors and industries of the priority of the protected sector for industrial 
development. For non-prioritised sectors, economic theory suggests a tariff of zero will maximise 
national welfare.22 A complex tariff structure such as that of SACU where over 100 different 
rates are applied dilutes the signal for resource allocation and reflects an ad hoc approach to 
sector prioritisation.  
A simple tariff structure with few bands is also easier to administer and is less open to 
corruption. Wide variations in tariff levels amongst similar products, as is found in the SACU 
tariff schedule, encourages false value declarations on highly protected products in order to 
benefit from lower tariff rates applied on similar products. And as discussed above, restricting 
tariffs to a number of bands limits arbitrary and time dependent differences in tariff rates across 
similar products. Restricting tariffs to a number of bands, in effect contributes towards a 
transparent rule based approach to tariff setting. 
There are also important political economy justifications for tariff simplification. A 
simple and preferably uniform tariff structure helps insulate government from interest groups that 
lobby for continued protection (Panagariya and Rodrik (1993).  The current complexity of the 
                                                 
21 Tariffs are also used as an instrument for revenue collection. This is not of significant 
importance for South Africa, but is of relevance for the remaining members of SACU, as will be discussed 
later. 
22 We ignore large country effects or strategic trade policy effects arising from imperfect 
competition. 
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SACU tariff structure as well as the marginal changes to tariff rates currently allowed under 
ITAC (albeit reductions in most cases) give scope for industries to lobby for continued protection 
on their goods and lower protection on their inputs.  Because these changes are often marginal 
and are obscured by a wide variation in applied tariffs, it is less likely that the tariff changes will 
be effectively challenged by groups negatively affected by the policy change. As pointed out by 
Corden (1966: 56) “protection unnoticed is protection more secure”. Recognition of these 
political economy dangers, contributed towards Chile’s simplification and finally implementation 
of a uniform tariff from the 1970s (Edwards and Lederman, 2002). 
These political economy issues should be of particular concern to the South African 
government as historically industry has been effective in lobbying for changes in protection. This 
is noticeable in the late 1980s where businesses effectively lobbied for additional protection in the 
face of the economic downturn (Bell, 1993), as well as during the 1990s where organised 
industries were effective in lobbying for tariff increases in the face of rising import penetration 
(Holden and Casale, 2002). Further, the significant rise in protection on clothing and textiles 
during 1992/93 is argued by GATT (1994: 170) to represent “… a clear-cut case of rent-seeking 
by entrenched special interests, with no final arbiter to guide the industry towards international 
competitiveness on the basis of free trade.” Finally, the imposition of import quotas on Chinese 
imports of clothing and Textile products in January 2007, in part reflects the effective lobbying 
by the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) that Chinese imports had 
contributed towards significant job losses in the industry.23 
Our proposal goes further than just simplification of the tariff structure. Our tariff reform 
proposal is to simplify the tariff structure through the elimination of tariffs on intermediate and 
capital goods and the reduction of tariffs on final goods by fairly large percentages. This strategy 
relies heavily on the fact that what counts for any industry is its effective rather than nominal rate 
                                                 
23 Edwards and Moriss (2007) show that one of the main justifications, that 60 000 jobs had been 
lost in the past few years, is based on erroneous comparison of employment numbers across two different 
and incomparable surveys. 
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of protection. What each industry cares about is not the protection that is granted to the products 
that it produces but to the value that it adds.  
If, for example, twenty percent of a car’s value, at world prices, comes from auto-
assembly operations and eighty percent from auto-parts that can be imported duty free, then a ten 
percent tariff on finished autos will confer a fifty percent effective rate of protection. If however, 
a ten percent tariff is levied on both parts and finished automobiles, the effective rate of 
protection on assembly will be only ten percent.  Auto assemblers would therefore get the same 
effective rate of protection from a two percent tariff on finished cars if there was no tariff on 
parts, as they would from a ten percent tariff on both finished cars and auto parts.24 
It is this basic notion that we exploit in our tariff liberalization design. By removing 
tariffs on inputs, we are able to limit the reductions in effective protection represented by the 
reduction in final tariffs. Hence, the employments losses in the final goods sector will be 
minimized and consumers will gain in the form of lower prices. In addition, import tariffs 
implicitly tax exports and confer negative rates of protection. So an approach which eliminates 
input tariffs will also stimulate exports by reducing or eliminating these penalties. 
There are two additional benefits of this proposal. Firstly, in some versions of the 
approach the need for input tariff rebates would be eliminated.  Currently extensive rebates on 
intermediate inputs and capital goods are granted to specific industrial sectors under Schedule 3 
and exporters under Schedule 4 (and 5 & 6). This is both administratively burdensome and 
discriminatory as the rebates on inputs are not granted to all industries. Further, the rebates 
discriminate against producers who rely on domestic suppliers and encourage the substitution of 
domestic inputs with imported intermediate inputs by export industries. Our approach, however, 
does not alter the current system whereby rebates are granted on final goods imported using 
                                                 
24  This can be shown as follows: )1()( ¦¦  
i
ij
i
iijjj atatERP
 where tj is the tariff on outputs, 
ti is the tariff on inputs and aij is the quantity of intermediate input i used in the production of one unit of j.  
Let the market price of the car be R 1 million. ERP under uniform 10 percent tariff = (10%-10%*0.8)/0.2 = 
10 percent.  In alternative scenario, ERP = (2% - 0%*.8)/0.2 = 10 percent.. 
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DCCs and IRCCs, although the value of these will diminish as tariffs on final goods (and 
intermediate inputs) declines. 
The extent of rebates granted is visible in Table 10 and Table 11 below. These tables 
compare the import weighted scheduled rate with the collection rate. The “efficiency” of 
collection, calculated as actual revenue over predicted revenue, is also provided. Overall, only 
56.7 percent of potential customs revenue is collected. The primary source of the under-collection 
is the duty rebate granted to the motor industry under the MIDP for the importation of inputs and 
final goods. Only 31.4 percent of potential duty is collected resulting in a collection rate of 8.9 
percent, which is substantially lower than the import weighted average tariff of 28.3 percent. The 
efficiency of collection also decreases at higher tariff rates, falling from around 90 percent for 
tariffs less than 5 percent to 65 percent for tariffs greater than 30 percent. The latter reflects 
rebates under the DCC, which are largely used to purchase clothing, as well as the greater 
incentive for industries to apply for duty rebates.  
 
Table 10: Average Scheduled tariff rates, collection rates and efficiency of collection, 2006 
(percent) 
Import 
weighted 
average tariff 
Average 
collection rate 
Efficiency
of collection 
Consumption 12.7 12.2 95.6 
Intermediate 2.6 1.9 75.5 
Capital 2.0 1.6 80.1 
Motor Cars 28.3 8.9 31.4 
TOTAL  7.4 4.2 56.7 
Source: DTI for collection duty, 2006 June Tariff Schedule from SARS.  
 
Table 11: Predicted and Actual Revenue by Tariff Bands, 2006. 
Bands  Tariff lines 
Predicted
revenue  
(R m) 
Actual 
Duty  
(R m) 
Efficiency of 
collection
Imports 
(R m) 
Implied Duty 
Collection 
Rate (%) 
Predicted
Schedule3  
Rebate (R m)
0% 3,344 - 5 Na 285,276 0.0 26 
=<5% 619 517 470 90.9 31,088 3.9 646 
=<10% 467 1,382 1,169 84.6 16,145 7.2 1,028 
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=<15% 648 1,917 1,671 87.2 14,407 11.6 1,153 
=<20% 518 4,166 3,416 82.0 22,768 15.0 3,623 
=<30% 432 13,045 3,436 26.3 50,038 6.9 7,539 
>30% 248 12,508 8,078 64.6 37,687 21.4 54 
na 394 - 34  -  33 
Grand 
Total 
6,670 33,535 19,030 56.7 457,409 4.2 14,102 
Source: SARS, DTI and own calculations. 
Note: It appears that excise duty is included with customs duty for tobacco and beverages. The above table 
removes the excise duties by assuming all potential revenue for these sectors is collected. 
 
A second advantage of zero rating or substantially reducing inputs is that it greatly 
facilitates regional integration. Unfair access to production inputs in regional trade partners is a 
primary reason for the implementation of rules of origin. In the SADC case, these rules of origin 
have been argued to be highly restrictive and inhibitive of trade flows within the region (Flatters, 
2005). Enabling duty free inputs, obviates much of the need for these rules of origin and hence 
will facilitate imports from the rest of SADC into SACU.  
Simulation scenarios. As an exploratory analysis we estimate the economic effects in three 
scenarios: 
x Scenario 1 (Sim 1): Input liberalisation with a 15 or zero percent tariff on final goods. 
In particular, a zero tariff on intermediate inputs and capital goods. A 15 percent tariff on 
final goods if the 2006 tariff is equal to or exceeds 10 percent, otherwise zero percent. 
x Scenario 2 (Sim 2): Input liberalisation with a 20, 10 or zero percent tariff on final 
goods. Tariffs are set to zero on intermediate inputs and capital goods.  For final goods, 
they are set at 20 percent if the 2006 tariff equals or exceeds 18 percent, 10 percent if the 
2006 tariff is greater than or equal to 8 percent and less than 18 percent and zero percent 
for the remaining products.  
x Scenario 3 (Sim 3): Partial liberalisation of inputs and a 20, 10 or zero percent tariff on 
final goods. Tariffs are equivalent to simulation 2, except for a tariff of 10 percent on 
intermediate inputs and capital goods if the original input tariff is greater than or equal to 
8 percent. 
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Scenario 1 represents the simplest application of our approach, namely a single band of positive 
tariffs on final goods and full elimination of tariffs on intermediate and capital goods. Scenario 2 
modifies the first Scenario by applying two bands (20 and 10 percent) of positive tariffs on final 
goods. In scenario 3, we also allow for a 10 percent tariff on some intermediate and capital goods. 
The extent of liberalisation in Sim 3 is therefore more moderate than the other scenarios. 
Model. To evaluate the effect of the proposed tariff policy reform on the South African economy, 
we extend the simple partial equilibrium model developed earlier and treat production for final 
goods, intermediate & capital goods and exports separately.25 Domestic production in each case is 
modelled as a function of value added per unit output. This specification allows us to model tariff 
reductions on inputs as well as final goods that leave effective rates of protection on final goods 
relatively unaffected.  
 An important caveat to our analysis is that it is basically static in nature and advocates of 
both freer trade and more protection are likely to claim that this understates the dynamic gains 
that would accrue if their preferred policies were adopted.  In theory the effects could go in either 
direction. “Sometimes”, as the saying goes, “a kick in the pants gets you going, at other times it 
just hurts.” On the one hand, more competition and open markets could stimulate competition and 
innovation. On the other hand, there are those who argue that that there are dynamic benefits from 
trade protection and that providing firms with a more secure domestic market stimulates 
investment and innovation. 
                                                 
25 The data are obtained from Quantec who provide output data classified according to 
intermediate goods, capital goods, household expenditure and capital goods. This data are based on the 
Supply Use tables provided by Statistics South Africa and are updated using other data sources from SSA. 
Some discrepancies with the SU tables are evident (for example the 2002 share intermediate inputs in total 
supply differs from the 2002 SU table) and it is unclear how the data are adjusted to ensure consistency 
with the national accounts. More importantly, the output data provided combines domestic and imported 
goods. To separate out domestic production from total supply, we assume common sector import 
penetration ratios across intermediate and final goods (incl. exports). An alternative approach is to 
decompose imports into intermediate, final and capital goods using the Broad Economic Classification 
provided by UN Statistics. This was attempted, but frequently imports exceeded total sales, leading to 
negative domestic production.  
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  The ASGISA program has identified weak competitive pressures in the South African 
economy as a constraint on growth. There is evidence in support of this view in the work of 
Agion and Fedderke (2006) who found that in the case of South Africa trade liberalization has 
increased competition, reduced profit margins and enhanced productivity and employment 
growth. Other South African studies (Jonsson and Subramanian, 2001; Belli et al., 1993; Fallon 
and Pereira de Silva, 1994; Fedderke, 2005 and Harding and Rattso, 2005) find consistent 
evidence that the dynamic productivity gains from liberalization and openness are large for South 
Africa.26 To the degree that these effects are significant, they suggest that the welfare gains from 
the liberalization we have estimated could well be far too conservative.   
Results. In the following section we highlight the main economic results emerging from our 
simulations. We first look at changes in tariff distortions, then analyse changes to output, 
employment, exports and welfare. 
Nominal protection. All scenarios give rise to significant reductions in nominal tariff protection 
as measured using import weighted tariffs (Figure 13) and the trade restrictiveness index (not 
shown here). Average tariffs fall from 7.3 percent to 1.8 percent for Sim 1, 2.2 percent for Sim 2 
and a more modest reduction to 4 percent for Sim 3. The decline in the TRI for each end-use 
category is roughly equivalent. The largest reductions in protection are on inputs which, apart 
from passenger vehicles, are set equal to zero in the case of Sim 1 and Sim 2. The small positive 
tariff on inputs in these two scenarios therefore reflects continued protection on passenger 
vehicles (15 percent in Sim 1, 20 percent in Sim 2). Tariffs on final goods also fall, from around 
18 percent to between 10 percent and 12 percent.  
Figure 13: Comparison of import weighted tariffs 
                                                 
26 Harding and Rattso (2005), for example, estimate that 70% of productivity improvements in the post 
sanction period can be explained by liberalisation. If the effect that liberalization has on the transfer of foreign 
technological improvements to SA is included, this share approaches 100%. 
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Comparison of import weighted tariffs
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Notes: Passenger vehicles (BEC 51) are included in both final goods and inputs 
 
Looking at the sectoral breakdown in Table A in the appendix, relatively large declines in 
nominal tariffs on final goods occur in clothing (37 percent to between 14 and 19 percent), motor 
vehicles (31 percent to between 15 and 19 percent) and leather products and footwear. Many of 
these are key consumption goods implying an improvement in consumer welfare through lower 
product prices. This is explored in more detail later. Tariffs on inputs fall most strongly for motor 
vehicles and parts in scenarios 1 and 2 (26 percent to 5-7 percent) largely due to the reduction to 
zero of the high tariffs on original equipment components (HS 98). These products account for a 
high proportion of overall imports (8 percent of total imports)27 Large declines in tariffs on inputs 
are also found in clothing, textiles and furniture. In scenario 2, tariffs are retained on inputs and 
relatively high levels of protection are found on vehicles, clothing, rubber and plastic products. 
Effective protection and profitability. Our simulation scenarios are also successful in retaining 
effective protection on final goods, but lead to significant reductions protection on intermediate 
and capital goods. This can be seen in the GDP weighted effective rates of protection presented in 
Table 12 and the two bar charts in Figure 14 below.   
                                                 
27  HS 98 is a specific category used under the MIDP. How we treat these has a significant impact 
on estimates of protection in the motor vehicle sector. These simulations I treat these as intermediate 
inputs, hence their tariff has been reduced to zero. 
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Table 12: Effective rates of protection 
 ERP Final consumption goods 
ERP Intermediate & Capital 
goods ERP Average   
 2006 Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 2006 Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 2006 Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 
All sectors 7.2% 6.3% 7.5% 5.7% 2.9% 0.3% 0.4% 1.2% 3.5% 1.0% 1.3% 1.6% 
Agriculture 7.2% 9.3% 8.0% 6.1% 0.7% -0.2% -0.3% -0.2% 1.2% 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
Mining -1.4% -0.1% -0.1% -0.8% -1.4% -0.1% -0.1% -0.8% -1.8% -0.5% -0.6% -1.0% 
Manufacturing 41.1% 30.4% 37.0% 31.2% 20.7% 2.0% 2.7% 9.5% 24.6% 7.0% 8.7% 12.4% 
Services -1.7% -0.1% -0.2% -0.9% -1.7% -0.1% -0.2% -0.9% -1.9% -0.5% -0.6% -1.1% 
Note: 2002 GDP values used as weights. The average ERP uses the import weighted average tariff for both 
final goods and inputs. 
 
In all scenarios, lower tariffs on intermediate and capital goods offset the negative impact 
on profitability from lower tariffs on final goods. The weighted average ERP for final goods 
(using 2002 GDP values) for all sectors including services declines in Sim 1 and 3, but actually 
rises in Sim 2. Since, as we have noted in simulation 2, import weighted average nominal tariffs 
on final goods are cut from 18 to 12 percent – a cut of 33 percent – the rise in effective protection 
is noteworthy. Even in the case of Sim 1, the nominal tariff reductions of a third are associated 
with declines of effective protection of less than 25 percent.  If we exclude the services sector, 
and only look at manufacturing, ERP on final goods falls in all scenarios. Looking at intermediate 
and capital goods, we find large decreases in effective protection, particularly within 
manufacturing where ERP falls from 20.7 percent to 2-3 percent in scenarios 1 and 2. The
simulation scenarios therefore retain much of the protection on final goods, but reduce 
protection significantly on intermediate and capital goods. Scenario 3 is interesting, in that it 
highlights the trade-off between effective protection on inputs and final goods. A higher tariff on 
inputs reduces effective protection in downstream industries.28  
                                                 
28 Consistent results are found when comparing value added per unit output for each scenario. 
Given that domestic production (including exports) is modelled as a function of value added per unit 
output, this comparison is arguably a better representation of the potential effect of each liberalisation 
scenario on production. Full liberalisation reduces average value added per unit output in manufacturing by 
25 percent for final products and 13 percent for inputs, but raises the profitability of export production by 
approximately 4 percent. Scenarios 1 and 2 lead to more moderate declines in value added per unit output 
for final goods (2-5 percent declines) while retaining the improvements in export profitability. Scenario 3 
differs in that retaining some tariffs on inputs limit the decline in profitability in these sectors, but at the 
expense of value added per unit output in the downstream final goods sectors and export sectors. 
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Figure 14: GDP weighted average effective rates of protection for all sectors and 
manufacturing 
ERP all sectors
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Our tariff scenarios also broadly preserve the rank order of effective protection for final 
goods. Figure 15 below presents scatter plots comparing ERP for final goods in 2006 with ERP in 
each scenario. The 45 degree line represents a perfect preservation of ERP for each sector. Under 
full liberalisation ERP are reduced to zero for all sectors. In Sim 1, the correlation with 2006 ERP 
values is positive, but relatively large declines in protection are experienced in high protection 
sectors such as clothing, textiles, leather, footwear and motor vehicles & parts. However, 
effective protection remains above 80% for these sectors.  In the case of Sim2, the estimated 
slope is very close to the 45 degree line, indicating very little change in the level and structure of 
effective protection across sectors. When we introduce input tariffs in Sim 3, effective protection 
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is once again reduced in these highly protected sectors. The most affected are clothing and 
vehicles where tariffs on textiles and vehicle components reduce profitability in the downstream 
clothing and vehicle industries. In conclusion, our scenarios generally preserve the sector rank 
order of protection on final products with simulation 2 the most successful in maintaining the 
very high levels of effective protection in the most protected industries.   
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Figure 15: Scatter plots of ERP for final goods in 2006 and each scenario 
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Note: All primary, manufacturing and services sectors are included in the above diagrams. 
Changes in anti-export bias. Finally, export profitability rises in almost all sectors in all 
scenarios. Relatively large increases are experienced in footwear, textiles, leather products, 
vehicles, clothing and food. Many of these are labour-intensive, suggesting that liberalisation 
under the two scenarios will enhance labour-intensive exports. An important exception, however, 
is the motor industry, where export profitability declines under full liberalisation and only rises 
moderately in Scenario 3. As discussed later, this arises from the changing value of export 
incentives provided by the IRCCs. 
Declining effective protection rates and export taxes under each tariff liberalisation 
scenario lower the anti-export bias of production (Table 13). The GDP weighted anti-export bias 
for final goods in manufacturing declines from 1.5 to around 1.3 and those for intermediate & 
capital goods from 1.2 to between 1 and 1.1. Nevertheless, production of final goods for the 
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domestic market remains approximately 30 percent more profitable than for the export market in 
each scenario. Similarly, at the sector level, while the anti-export bias has declined, it remains 
relatively high in many sectors, particularly the labour intensive sectors including clothing, 
footwear, textiles and leather products.  
Table 13: Anti-export bias 
 2006 Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 
Final
goods 
Intermediat
e & capital 
goods 
Final
goods 
Intermediat
e & capital 
goods 
Final
goods 
Intermediat
e & capital 
goods 
Final
goods 
Intermediat
e & capital 
goods 
Traded sectors 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.1
Agriculture 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0
Mining 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Manufacturing 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.1
Services 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Note: Anti-export bias is measured as (1+ERP)/(1-export tax) 
 
Output. Liberalisation in each scenario leads to structural shifts in the economy away from import 
competing sectors towards export oriented sectors (Figure 16). Export growth is driven by 
improved profitability arising from lower costs of intermediate inputs. Interestingly, export 
growth is stronger under Sim 2 and Sim 1, than under full liberalisation and Sim 3. This is largely 
indicative of the extensive support granted to the motor industry in the form of duty credits. The 
value of the duty credits for exporters is directly related to the tariff rates on motor vehicles and 
parts. With full liberalisation, the incentive for export production granted through IRCCs is 
reduced to zero. In our estimates, the IRCCs plus 470.03 rebates provide vehicle and parts 
exporters a subsidy that exceeds the cost raising effects of high domestic prices for protected 
intermediate inputs. Hence, full liberalisation leads to significant reductions in exports of motor 
vehicle and parts (see Table B in Appendix).  Tariffs on inputs do matter, as is shown in the 
stagnant growth in exports of vehicles when tariffs on components are retained (Sim 3). The 
availability of duty rebates under the DCC scheme leads to similar trends in the clothing and 
textile sectors. 
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Figure 16: Sources of change in aggregate output in traded sectors 
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Note: Percentage reflect change from 2006 value for that category 
The growth in exports, however, is insufficient to offset declining domestic production of 
import competing products leading to a net decline in domestic production. The overall decline in 
production of traded goods in each scenario is small (less than 0.5 percent) and is not experienced 
in all sectors. In Scenario 2 for example, domestic production decreases in only 13 of the 32 
traded sectors. The net decline in output is primarily driven by declining output in the motor 
vehicle and parts industry and to a lesser extent clothing and textiles. Excluding, motor vehicles 
and parts, we find close to zero or even a positive change in manufacturing output in Sim 1 and 2 
(see Figure 17 below). Hence, in the non-motor vehicle industries export growth, combined with 
small declines in production of final goods, offsets the decline in production of intermediate and 
capital goods. 
Reducing the extent of liberalisation on intermediate inputs, as is simulated in scenario 3, 
appears to exacerbate the effect on aggregate output. While production of intermediate inputs is 
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less affected, production of final goods and exports in particular decline by more than the other 
scenarios. Continued protection on inputs, is therefore at the expense of production of final goods 
and exports.  
Figure 17: Output changes (percent) 
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Employment. The sectoral composition of employment changes is similar to that of output, 
although the net effects differ slightly. Employment opportunities are created in the expanding 
industries, with relatively large gains in employment experienced in the agricultural, machinery 
and iron & steel sectors. Employment opportunities are also created in the services sector.  
 Nevertheless, the net effect on employment is negative. Under full liberalisation, 
employment in traded sectors declines by around 25,000, with roughly half of this accounted for 
by the motor vehicle and parts industry. Under scenario 1, employment losses in traded sectors 
fall to around 9,000 and for scenario 2 employment losses equal approximately 5,000. If, 
however, we include the roughly 4,500 jobs created in services, the job losses in Sim 1 are halved 
and job losses in Sim 2 fall to a mere 450.  
The better employment outcome in Scenario 1 and 2 compared to full liberalisation arise 
from higher export growth and lower declines in employment within the final goods sectors. In all 
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simulations, we find lower job reductions in the labour-intensive clothing, textile and footwear 
sectors. The weaker employment results for scenario 3 compared to scenario 2, reflect higher 
input costs leading to lower exports and final output, with relatively large declines experienced in 
clothing and motor vehicles. Unlike output, employment in manufacturing falls, even when the 
motor vehicle sector is excluded. This arises from the decline in output in the labour intensive 
sectors such as textiles and clothing (Table 14).  
Figure 18: Change in employment in traded sectors by end-use classification 
Change in employment by end-use classification
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Figure 19: Aggregate employment change (percent) 
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Table 14: Employment effect of Scenarios 
 
Employment 
2006 Full liberalisation Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 
 Jobs 
Change in 
jobs % Change
Change in 
jobs % Change
Change in 
jobs % Change 
Change in 
jobs % Change
Agriculture 791,702 921 0.1% 1,257 0.2% 1,163 0.1% 360 0.0%
Coal mining 55,336 57 0.1% 53 0.1% 52 0.1% 26 0.0%
Gold & Plat 163,419 167 0.1% 166 0.1% 165 0.1% 71 0.0%
Other mining 239,720 93 0.0% 87 0.0% 85 0.0% 43 0.0%
Food 167,311 -987 -0.6% 75 0.0% 213 0.1% -188 -0.1%
Beverages 37,891 94 0.2% 97 0.3% 100 0.3% 40 0.1%
Tobacco 2,818 -13 -0.5% -4 -0.1% -1 0.0% -5 -0.2%
Textiles 47,634 -2,056 -4.3% -1,138 -2.4% -935 -2.0% -570 -1.2%
Clothing 76,206 -9,395 -12.3% -4,180 -5.5% -2,882 -3.8% -3,627 -4.8%
Leather prods 7,912 222 2.8% 284 3.6% 298 3.8% 91 1.1%
Footwear 10,619 -1,262 -11.9% -377 -3.6% -163 -1.5% -342 -3.2%
Wood & prods 59,641 11 0.0% 16 0.0% 17 0.0% 29 0.0%
Paper & prods 37,213 50 0.1% 79 0.2% 81 0.2% 27 0.1%
Printing 53,421 -104 -0.2% -100 -0.2% -102 -0.2% -3 0.0%
Petrol ref 16,709 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% -4 0.0%
Basic chems 20,559 23 0.1% 22 0.1% 21 0.1% 12 0.1%
Other chems 48,969 52 0.1% 96 0.2% 89 0.2% 21 0.0%
Rubber prods 14,233 -281 -2.0% -211 -1.5% -211 -1.5% -89 -0.6%
Plastic prods 39,352 -222 -0.6% -215 -0.5% -215 -0.5% -44 -0.1%
Glass & prods 9,831 -79 -0.8% -79 -0.8% -79 -0.8% -15 -0.2%
Non-met mins 60,403 -447 -0.7% -430 -0.7% -426 -0.7% -146 -0.2%
Bas iron & st 53,085 350 0.7% 344 0.6% 343 0.6% 161 0.3%
Bas n-fer met 22,319 24 0.1% 23 0.1% 23 0.1% 10 0.0%
Metal prods 126,838 -382 -0.3% -346 -0.3% -340 -0.3% -48 0.0%
Machinery 106,692 996 0.9% 1,116 1.0% 1,125 1.1% 627 0.6%
Electr mach 42,637 -302 -0.7% -160 -0.4% -160 -0.4% -71 -0.2%
Tv & coms eq 8,770 -61 -0.7% -2 0.0% 9 0.1% -13 -0.1%
Scientific eq 9,596 122 1.3% 121 1.3% 121 1.3% 56 0.6%
Motveh & parts 135,537 -12,458 -9.2% -5,689 -4.2% -3,789 -2.8% -4,157 -3.1%
Oth trnsp eq 13,138 39 0.3% 64 0.5% 55 0.4% 24 0.2%
Furniture 39,396 -395 -1.0% -14 0.0% 63 0.2% 9 0.0%
Other 63,509 0 0.0% 196 0.3% 213 0.3% 24 0.0%
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manufacturing 
Services 4,582,368 4,797 0.1% 4,661 0.1% 4,615 0.1% 2,043 0.0%
 
Revenue. Approximately R18 billion of tariff revenue was collected in 2006. Liberalisation 
reduces the tariff per imported product, but also raises imports which has a positive effect on 
tariff revenue. Our simulations indicate that the tariff effect dominates leading to a decline in 
revenue by approximately 62 percent in Sim 1 to R6.7 billion, 54 percent in Sim 2 to R7.6 billion 
and 33 percent in Sim 3 to R12 billion.  
Figure 20: Revenue implications of liberalisation 
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Welfare effects. As shown earlier, the removal of all tariffs leads to a net welfare improvement as 
production and consumption distortions are eliminated. Figure 21 compares the net welfare effect 
each scenario with that of full liberalisation. Our results show that partial liberalisation, as in Sim 
1, 2 & 3, lead to lower gains in net welfare than full liberalisation. The net welfare gain from full 
liberalisation of approximately R2.6 billion declines to R2 billion in Sim 1 and R1.7 billion in 
Sim 2 & 3. Once again, liberalisation of the motor vehicle industry is the single most important 
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source of gain from liberalisation in each scenario. The net welfare gain declines by more than 
half if the motor industry is excluded. 
Figure 21: Net national welfare gain from liberalisation scenarios 
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The lower output, employment and revenue losses in scenarios 1 to 3 relative to full 
liberalisation therefore come at the cost of lower net national welfare gains. To explore this 
further, we compare the outcomes of each scenario as a proportion of the outcomes under the 
elimination of all tariff protection (Table 15).  
What is striking is that simplification and reform of the tariff structure as we propose makes it 
possible to realize 63 to 77 percent of the net welfare gains from complete liberalization 
with just 20 to 35 percent of the job losses in traded sectors. For example, in Sim 1, 
employment in traded sectors decline, but by only 35 percent of the decline under full 
liberalization. The net welfare gain is also lower, but 77 percent of the potential gains are 
realized. Sim 2 does even better in preserving in employment and while the welfare 
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benefits are smaller, the benefit/jobs loss ratio is even better. In Sim 3, the net welfare 
effects are similar to Sim 2, but the employment losses are greater.
29
 
Table 15: Comparison of outcomes 
 Simulation outcomes 
Proportion of 
liberalisation outcome 
 Liberalise Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 
Change in employment (number)       
All sectors (excl gov) -20,426 -4,190 -452 -5,649 21% 2% 28%
Traded sectors -25,223 -8,850 -5,067 -7,692 35% 20% 30%
Manufacturing -26,461 -10,413 -6,532 -8,193 39% 25% 31%
Manufacturing excl vehicles -14,003 -4,724 -2,743 -4,035 34% 20% 29%
Change in revenue (Rm)      
Traded sectors -17,850 -7,561 -7,196 -3,508 42% 40% 20%
Manufacturing -17,748 -7,508 -7,143 -3,478 42% 40% 20%
Manufacturing excl vehicles -10,176 -3,952 -3,952 -1,445 39% 39% 14%
National welfare gain (Rm)     
All sectors (excl gov) 2,625 2,027 1,665 1,695 77% 63% 65%
Traded sectors 2,613 2,015 1,653 1,688 77% 63% 65%
Manufacturing 2,609 2,014 1,652 1,685 77% 63% 65%
Manufacturing excl vehicles 1,063 755 601 662 71% 57% 62%
Gain in consumer surplus (Rm)     
All sectors (excl gov) 42,917 19,834 14,878 14,878 46% 35% 35%
Traded sectors 42,917 19,834 14,878 14,878 46% 35% 35%
Manufacturing 41,932 19,701 14,632 14,632 47% 35% 35%
Manufacturing excl vehicles 29,802 13,367 10,183 10,183 45% 34% 34%
Change in output (Rm)      
All sectors (excl gov) -12,933 -3,432 -1,130 -3,580 27% 9% 28%
Traded sectors -14,856 -5,274 -2,945 -4,422 36% 20% 30%
Manufacturing -15,105 -5,555 -3,212 -4,528 37% 21% 30%
Manufacturing excl vehicles -3,119 -82 433 -528 3% -14% 17%
 
Looking at consumer welfare, we note lower gains relative to liberalization in 
comparison with the net national welfare gains. This arises because each of the scenarios retains 
protection on final consumption goods. Nevertheless, as can be seen in Figure 22, the net welfare 
gain and consumer surplus gain per job lost for each scenario still exceed that of full 
liberalisation. In each case, the consumer gains per job lost are very high and exceed the average 
wage of R71,000 for workers in traded sectors. In the full liberalisation scenario, the consumer 
                                                 
29 Net national welfare gains are greater under Sim 3 compared to Sim 2, despite the imposition of 
tariffs on inputs in the former scenario. This largely reflects distortions in the motor vehicle. In Sim 3 input 
tariffs reduce the value of the 27 percent duty rebate granted to domestic vehicle producers as well as the 
value of the IRCC granted to vehicle exporters. 
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gain per job lost equals over R2 million if we include non-government services, or R1.7 million if 
we focus on traded sectors. In Sim 1, the net welfare gain per job lost is R230 thousand and for 
Sim 2 the value is R330 thousand. Raising tariffs on inputs in this scenario (scenario 3) reduces 
these welfare gains per job to a level similar or slightly worse than scenario 1. Similar trends are 
evident when looking at the consumer surplus gains per job loss. Finally, if we include services, 
the welfare gains per job loss for Sim 1 and 2 rise even further reflecting lower job losses in these 
scenarios. 
Figure 22: Welfare gains per job lost, traded sectors only 
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Consumer surplus gain (Rm) per job lost
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The impact on consumption expenditure of the poor is also positive (Figure 23). The 
expenditure weighted average tariff declines for all household deciles, but the decline is 
proportionately larger for poorer households. The tariff structure remains regressive, but the 
overall tariff burden on poor households is substantially lower.  
 
Figure 23: Expenditure weighted tariff by decile for each scenario 
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Conclusions. What we have shown is that much of the welfare gains from liberalisation can be 
achieved through our proposed approach to tariff reform. Simplification of the tariff structure that 
is heavily focused on finished goods and implements extensive liberalization of capital goods and 
intermediate inputs improves transparency, promotes exports, enhances consumer welfare and 
reduces the adjustment costs associated with dislocation. Although the elimination of tariffs leads 
to the greatest net welfare gain and gain to consumers, our scenarios show that the welfare gains 
per job lost are significantly higher in each scenario compared to full liberalisation. A useful 
approach towards realising the full gains from liberalisation may therefore be to first simplify the 
tariff regime through liberalising the intermediate and capital good sector, while reducing tariffs 
on final goods to one or two rates. There is also the option of retaining tariffs on some 
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intermediate inputs, but this is often at the expense of output and employment in the export and 
final goods sectors.  
 Whatever the aggregate benefits, the lowering of trade barriers can cause dislocation. 
In the South African context, given the extremely high rates of unemployment, this can inhibit 
taking policies that could actually stimulate long run growth and employment.  These concerns 
should be addressed through several policy responses. The first is to phase in the changes 
gradually but steadily so that the adjustment can be spread over time.  The second is to consider 
programs that can aid in the adjustment of industries, workers and communities. In the case of 
industries, a viable safeguards program is important. In the event that the disruption has been 
underestimated, upon demonstrating that imports are causing (or threatening to cause) serious 
injury, protection that is sufficient to offset the injury should be temporarily re-imposed.  In the 
case of workers, one approach would be to establish a SACU adjustment assistance program that 
would draw on tariff revenues in order to establish a program that would assist dislocated workers 
and communities. Following procedures such as those which are in operation in the United States 
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) Program, groups of dislocated workers (or their unions) 
could petition for an investigation of the reasons for their dislocation. If import competition 
resulting from liberalization is found to be the major cause of their job loss, workers could be 
declared eligible for trade adjustment assistance. This could take the form of some combination 
of unemployment compensation, training, and temporary wage-loss compensation in the event 
that wages fall in their next jobs.  Finally, communities (municipalities) in which there is job loss 
or large plant closures due to trade could be given trade adjustment grants. We therefore propose 
that as part of the process of reforming the SACU tariff structure, various adjustment assistance 
programmes be explored. 
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Section 4: Regional Trading Arrangements. 
 South Africa participates fully in the major African institutions organizations that have 
broad and ambitious political and economic goals such as the African Union that seeks the 
establishment of an integrated African Economic Community. However, the most important of 
these organizations for South Africa’s regional trading relationships are SACU and SADC.30 
Currently these agreements present major challenges: with respect to SACU the principle issue 
relates to the Revenue Sharing Formula (RSF) and with respect to SADC the principle question 
relates to the ultimate viability of the agenda to achieve a customs union by 2010. 
 In this section of the paper we discuss options for dealing with these challenges. In 
particular, we consider a more explicit division of the aid and tariff-revenue sharing components 
of SACU, a step we believe will be much easier to accomplish if the tariff simplification exercise 
proposed above is implemented, but would, in any case, be desirable.   We also consider some 
options for SADC and South Africa’s trade relations with other African countries. In this regard 
we emphasize concentrating on measures that facilitate duty-free trade in goods and services on 
the ground rather than more complex customs union arrangements. In addition we advocate 
additional free trade agreements with non-SADC African nations either individually or in groups. 
 A key ASGISA goal is export diversification and it is in its trade with Africa that South 
Africa has made the most strides in this regard.  While South Africa has important political 
interests in Africa, it is also evident that regional markets in Africa play a crucial role for the 
South African economy particularly with respect to exports of non-commodity manufactured 
goods and services. As the many estimates using gravity models confirm, distance -- both cultural 
and geographic – powerfully matters for trade, and the markets that are closest often provide the 
greatest opportunities. The early numbers in the 90s are affected by the end of the apartheid 
                                                 
30 In addition to South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) belong to 
SACU. The SADC consists of SACU plus Angola, DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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regime, but it is clear that South African firms have achieved rapid growth exporting to and 
investing in the rest of Africa.31 It also appears to be the case that compared with other regions, 
the rest of Africa’s share of trade with South Africa’s is still relatively small and there is 
considerable scope for expansion.32
 Table 16 
 
                                                 
31 Africa’s share of overall South African exports has increased from 6.6 percent in 1990, to 12.3 
percent in 1995, 12.6 percent in 2000 and 13.8 in 2005. In the same years, the share of imports from Africa 
has increased from 1.8 percent in 1990 to 5.2 percent in 2005. Africa’s share of total direct investment by 
South African firms also rose from 6 percent in 2002 to between 8 and 10 percent in 2005 (South African 
Reserve Bank data). 
32According to Arora and Vamvakidis (2005) “Although South Africa’s relative importance in 
regional; trade has grown since 1994, it remains small compared with, for example, the regional trade 
shares of the United States in other Western Hemisphere countries and those of China and Japan in the rest 
of Asia”  
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 South Africa’s regional policies need to achieve two principle objectives: First, to create 
an environment that facilitates exports of goods and services and direct foreign investments by 
South African-based firms. This would not only be conducive to the expansion of South African 
owned firms but it would also allow South Africa to attract foreign firms that are interested in 
using it as a regional hub. And second, to stimulate regional economic development by increasing 
these countries ability to export to South Africa and to attract FDI.  Over time, the development 
of its African neighbors will provide larger markets for South African goods and services and 
reduce the poverty in these nations that leads to political instability, illegal immigration and other 
pressures that detract from South Africa’s own economic development.33 While we will 
concentrate relatively narrowly on tariff issues we should emphasize that although trade policies 
represent an important instrument for achieving these goals, they are not a substitute for 
initiatives that create both the physical (roads, telecommunications) and institutional 
infrastructure (finance, regulatory regimes and competitiveness) that facilitate trade and 
investment.   
 In pursuing its objectives, South Africa needs to find the right balance between (a) 
insisting that its regional partners adhere to binding commitments and avoid discrimination 
against South African exports and firms and (b) providing them with adequate policy space, 
preferences, and financial assistance.  Finding this balance presents particular challenges for 
South Africa since its trading partners in the rest of Africa are sometimes afraid of South African 
dominance. 34 This is the inevitable result of South Africa’s size and level of industrialization and 
as a consequence, its relationships with regional partners are inevitably characterized by 
considerable asymmetry. In any interaction, it seems quite natural to its trading partners that 
                                                 
33 As Siphambe (2004) observes, “..most SADC countries are already integrated outside official 
efforts through undocumented cross-border trade and illegal movements of labor and people. 
34 There is an unfortunate tendency to adopt a mercantilist posture when evaluating national 
benefits from regional trade arrangements. Thus an agreement is viewed as detrimental/favorable if it 
increases/reduces the bilateral trade deficit. Of course this neglects the gains that could accrue to consumers 
in the form of lower prices  
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South Africa should bare a disproportionate share of the costs.  In response, South Africa has 
signed regional agreements which (a) which have a strong compensatory component or (b) which 
result in less than full reciprocity, both with respect to timing and coverage.  This does not mean 
that these initiatives are not beneficial to South Africa, but it does give rise to complications.  
SACU. Consider SACU, which dates back to 1910. SACU has a common external tariff 
which all five members apply. In this respect, their tariff obligations are almost fully symmetrical 
– although there are provisions allowing infant industry exceptions for the BLNS.  However, the 
tariff revenues are redistributed in a manner that is generous to the BLNS members and expensive 
for South Africa.  Specifically, the revenue sharing formula (RSF) requires that after a fifteen 
percent contribution from all revenues has been distributed into a development fund, each SACU 
member receives a share of overall customs revenue equal to its share in intra-SACU trade. 35 In 
addition, members divide excise duties in proportion to GDP. Since the BLNS are very open to 
South African imports, their shares in intra-SACU trade are much larger than their shares in the 
SACU imports that generate the customs revenues.   The net result is considerable redistribution 
and South Africa which accounts for about 86 percent of population and 90 percent of SACU 
GDP and as high as 97 percent of extra-SACU imports actually receives about 20 percent of all 
(non-excise) tariff revenues. 36  
 The RSF has proven to be especially generous in the current expansion since there has 
been extremely strong growth in South African consumer spending particularly on automobiles 
that bear a high tariff. 37 This has resulted in a very rapid growth in SACU revenues and the 
payments to BLNS countries have risen from R9.7 billion in 2003/04 to an astounding R25.2 
                                                 
35 The development fund is then distributed in proportions inversely related to per capita GDP. 
36 Trade shares calculated for 2001 using UN COMTRADE DATA 
37 The increased revenue reflects rapid import growth, particularly of autos which are subject to 
high tariffs in combination with the relatively slower growth in auto exports that benefit from Import 
Rebate Credit Certificates that come out of the revenue pool.  
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billion in 2006/2007.  These now comprise almost half of government revenues for Namibia, 
Lesotho and Swaziland and a fifth of government revenues of Botswana.38 
While there is little doubt that currently BLNS are net beneficiaries from this arrangement, there 
has, in the past, been some dispute over whether South African is transferring net benefits to the 
BLNS through the revenue sharing formula or simply compensating them for trade diversion 
because of the higher prices they pay on South African goods as a result of SACU. In fact, it 
appears they are treated very generously with the amounts being transferred far in excess of the 
likely impact of SACU tariffs on BLNS import prices.  According to Flatters and Stern (2006) for 
example the probable impact of SACU tariffs in 2006 was to raise prices in BLNS countries by a 
range of between 9.6 percent (for Lesotho) and 7.4 percent (for Namibia). Even without taking 
account of the offsetting benefits from the higher prices on the exports of the BLNS to South 
Africa this works out to additional payments to South Africa in the form of higher prices that are 
far less than the customs transfer under the SACU Revenue sharing formula. 39 
 Problems with the RSF.  The current revenue sharing formula (RSF) is problematic for 
many reasons.40  First, it inhibits trade. Since shares are based on intra-SACU trade the RSF 
creates an incentive for countries to tightly police (and overstate) their intra-SACU trade thereby 
weakening one of the benefits of a customs union -- the ability to eliminate internal custom and 
border controls.  At times this has given rise to disputes among the parties over the value of trade 
that has actually taken place.  Second, it introduces volatility. As the recent experience of 
explosive growth in revenues makes clear, there is considerable instability in the revenues 
received by the BLNS countries. This makes planning difficult and raises the risks that countries 
could adjust spending to revenue growth that turns out to be temporary.  Third, the payments are 
effectively arbitrary.  Since the redistribution is undertaken in a mechanical fashion, South Africa 
cannot control the amount of compensation it is providing and in recent years, the BLNS have 
                                                 
38 Flatters and Stern (2006) 
39 SACU Revenue Sharing: Issues and Options March 2006  
40 A more detailed discussion of many of these points can be found in Flatters and Stern (2006). 
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received a windfall disproportional to their costs of participating in SACU. Fourth, the RSF 
creates perverse incentives that could distort policies by misaligning costs and benefits. On the 
one hand, BLNS countries have an incentive to resist additional liberalization since they could 
bear a disproportionately high share of the revenue loss; on the other hand, South Africa has an 
incentive to use rebates as an industrial policy tool (Such as the MIDP) since it will pay a 
disproportionately small share of the revenue costs. Fifth, it inhibits new accessions. The current 
RSF presents particular problems when additions to SACU membership are contemplated. 
Existing members other than South Africa fear revenue dilution, and while new members may be 
attracted by the money – that is not a good reason for their membership.  South Africa is in turn 
reluctant to move forward to expand SACU for fear it might have to increase its financial support. 
Sixth, as noted by Flatters and Stern (2006) the development basis of the distributions is unclear. 
Per-capita the largest transfers are going to Swaziland and Botswana and much smaller transfers 
are being allocated to Lesotho which is much poorer.  Seventh, because it is embedded in SACU, 
South Africa receives little credit for its generosity as an international donor and finally, South 
Africa is unable to ensure that the funds are spent on development.  Eight, since the revenues are 
substantial and integrated into the BLNS budgets, it weakens their incentives to develop adequate 
tax bases. All told this mechanism appears ripe for reform and as we discuss below the most 
straight forward way to do this would be to assign the revenues on a more rational basis while at 
the same time, granting the BLNS aid through a separate SACU development fund.  
 SADC. The members of the SADC may share the same continent but they are a very 
diverse group of countries. They include the five SACU members, two developing countries 
Zimbabwe and Mauritius, and several least developed countries (LDCs) Angola, Mozambique, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. Ultimately, the trade protocol which came into effect 
in 2000 calls for SADC to become a Free Trade Area by 2008 when 85 percent of internal SADC 
trade will be free.  The protocol also calls for a customs union to be implemented by 2010. 
 74
 In an effort to accommodate the diversity of its members, in the trade protocol the SACU 
countries agreed to front-load their reductions (with the exception of some sensitive products) and 
to eliminate all duties on SADC imports by 2005. These commitments have been implemented 
and SACU now permits almost all qualifying products from SADC to enjoy duty free access.  In 
the protocol, the two developing countries were allowed to take longer to phase in their 
liberalization, while the LDC liberalization has been back-loaded. Nonetheless there are reports 
that as of 2007, LDCS such as Mozambique have begun to come into compliance. 
 Figure 24: SA imports from SADC 
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Figure 25: SA exports to SADC 
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 It appears that SADC is working, not simply with respect to implementing obligations, 
but also in generating some new trade flows.  In particular, as shown in the above figures, in 
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recent years South African imports from SADC countries while relatively small have been 
growing rapidly. SADC will also offer additional opportunities to deepen integration particularly 
with respect to trade in services such as transportation, finance, tourism, construction, energy, and 
communication.41 Work has already been completed on a draft annex and services negotiations 
will take place over the next few years and are expected to come into effect by 2015. 
 SADC coexists with a second major regional trade agreement in which South Africa is 
not a member, -- COMESA. COMESA has an even broader membership and an ambitious 
agenda that includes establishing a customs union even earlier than SADC i.e. by 2008. 42 It too 
has made considerable progress in this direction –although not all members are participating – in 
2007 agreeing on the parameters of the Common External Tariff. These will set tariffs on semi-
finished products at 10 percent, and those on finished goods at 25. 43  
 SADC and COMESA have several members in common: Madagascar, Malawai, 
Mauritius, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania belong to both SADC and COMESA. 
Tanzania is in addition a member of a third customs union -- the East African Community and 
Swaziland is a member of SACU. In principle, this overlapping membership of arrangements that 
seek to establish customs unions creates problems for establishing a common external tariff. 
 One way to reconcile these conflicting obligations is for these different arrangements to 
adopt the same external tariffs and to have a free trade agreement among them. But there are no 
commitments to do this and in any case, in order to be effective, customs unions need to integrate 
other policies such as sharing tariff revenues, establishing administrative bodies to deal with 
administered protection (safeguards, antidumping and countervailing duties) and rules governing 
standards, technical barriers and so on, and it is unclear if these could all be reconciled and 
                                                 
41 These plans for deeper integration are elaborated in the Regional Indicative Strategic 
development Plan (RISDP) 
42 Comesa members include Burundi,Comoros, Djibouti, DRC, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar,Malawi,Mauritius,Rwanda,Seychelles,Sudan,Swaziland,Uganda,Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
43 Several members appear reluctant to make this commitment. Reportedly, Angola, Ethiopia and 
Uganda are among those currently sitting on the sidelines, citing concerns about the possible impact on 
their economies. 
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effectively implemented. Moreover SADC also has plans for a monetary union by 2016 and 
COMESA has monetary union objective over a longer time horizon, and it is surely the case that 
overlapping membership would preclude both of these initiatives from independently being 
realized. 44 
 Instead, it appears that the countries participating in several arrangements are (a) seeking 
to gain the maximum short -term political and economic advantages from belonging to more than 
one agreement, particularly if they have been allowed to delay their own implementation or (b) 
hedging their bets until they are forced to decide among arrangements.   
 Whatever the advantages to these members, their behavior surely detracts from the 
overall credibility of the arrangements. It is also problematic for members to make preferential 
liberalization commitments on a reciprocal basis to countries that may eventually leave the 
arrangement. SACU countries for example have for several years granted Tanzanian products 
duty free access in anticipation of eventually being granted reciprocity for SACU exports. But 
what if Tanzania eventually adopts an EAC or COMESA Common External Tariff that levies 
duties on SACU products?   
 A related problem stems from the fact that in the current Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the European Union, countries are negotiating in groups that 
do not correspond to their memberships in regional groupings. All the members of SACU, 
including South Africa, are included in a single EPA configuration, which is an important 
milestone. However, other SADC members are negotiating an EU EPA separately with the 
eastern and southern African group, while the Democratic Republic of Congo has slotted in with 
the central Africa negotiating bloc. Again, this would not really matter if the EU makes similar 
demands of all groups, but given the diversity in their membership this might not be the case.  
 Why Customs Unions? Almost all of the agreements that have been negotiated among 
African countries reflect the presumption that large customs unions among African countries are 
                                                 
44 See Buigut  (2006) 
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desirable and feasible.  Several papers have been written focusing on the incoherence of these 
current arrangements and commitments, offering approaches that could reduce these 
inconsistencies. 45 But before attempting such efforts, some fundamental questions about the 
benefits and costs of customs unions should be introduced. 
 Customs unions do undoubtedly provide benefits. Above all, since no matter where they 
enter the union, goods pay the same tariff, customs unions offer the prospects of eliminating 
internal customs barriers and the necessity for rules of origin, thereby allowing for deeper 
integration of goods markets. In addition, the task of establishing a common external tariff could 
lead to simple and more effective tariff structures that are less affected by domestic political 
lobbies in particular members. It is noteworthy, for example, that the COMESA and EAC 
proposals for CETs are simple and both call for only two bands. Since it takes a complicated 
negotiation to adjust them, once set in place, these tariff structures are also more likely to be 
stable, thereby giving the private sector a more secure policy environment.  The exercise may 
also be politically attractive since it allows members to express solidarity with each other.  It may 
also give small countries a way of constraining or at least influencing the behavior of larger 
members.  A customs union may also allow the members to bargain more effectively with 
outsiders than they would if they negotiated individually. It could also generate revenues that 
could be used either for joint purposes (as in the EU) or for redistribution among members. In 
addition, the experience of the EU has been that the challenge of jointly operating a customs 
union has induced cooperation among countries that were once enemies. Indeed, each step 
towards deeper integration seemed to expose the need for even further integrative steps to be 
taken. Witness the progression from the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1952 to the 
EEC (1958), the EMS (1979) and the EU (1993) and the Euro Area in 1999. 
 But these benefits all come at some cost and thus customs unions should not be 
undertaken lightly. To realize the benefits, countries need to be fully committed to the enterprise. 
                                                 
45 See for example Draper et al. (2007) and Gibb (2006). 
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If there are doubts about an agreement’s credibility, private agents are unlikely to undertake the 
investments necessary to take advantage of it. You would not invest in an African distribution 
network centered in just one country, for example, if you believed that trade barriers among them 
could be resurrected.  
 Second, giving up the ability to use trade policy independently should not be undertaken 
likely. Discretionary trade policy could be an important development tool that countries may wish 
to retain.  One of the costs of preferential trade agreements, for example, is that they not only 
create trade but may also divert trade. With a customs union, however, countries give up the 
discretion to mitigate such diversion by unilaterally liberalizing.  Third, agreeing on the 
appropriate external tariff is not a simple matter, not only because countries may be susceptible to 
protectionist pressures but also because they may have very different characteristics. If they are at 
different stages of economic development, they are likely to differ in their views on the 
desirability of a particular structure and level of tariffs. Countries with poorly developed tax 
collection capacities, for example, may require tariffs for revenue purposes. Also countries may 
not share the same approach to trade policy. Some might wish to use tariffs to complement their 
industrial policies, while others might prefer a limited number of bands. 
 These diverse and often incompatible objectives for the region as a whole, are clearly 
reflected in the diverse MFN tariff rates applied by each SADC economy (Table 17). Average 
levels of protection vary from 12 to 15 percent for the DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe to low values for Mauritius (3.1 percent) and to a lesser extent 
Angola (7.1 percent) and SACU (8.2 percent). The MFN tariff structures also vary enormously in 
terms of complexity. Most noticeably, SACU has 100 tariff bands (including non-ad valorem 
rates), compared to 4 to 11 bands for the remaining SADC economies (with the exception of 
Mauritius and Zimbabwe who have slightly higher bands), have far fewer bands ranging from 4 
to 11. Finally, there is considerable sectoral variation of tariff levels and tariff peaks (defined as 
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tariff rates above 15 percent).46 Negotiation of a common external tariff to be applied by the CU 
will require considerable adjustments in their external tariff rate for many SADC economies.  
Table 17: Structure of MFN tariffs applied by SADC economies, 2006 
  Ang DRC Mad Mal Mau Moz Tan Zam Zim SACU
Number of tariff lines 5,224 5,224 5,222 5,112 5,224 5,224 5,212 5,224 5,224 6420
Number of bands 7 5 4 7 21 5 11 4 17 100
Duty free lines (% total) 0 0 2 9 86 2 37 22 15 53
Non-ad valorem (% lines) 0.8 0.3 0 0 2.8 0 0.2 0 - 2.9
Tariff quotas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C
o
m
p
le
x
it
y
 
Binding coverage (%) 100 100 29.7 31.2 17.8 13.6 13.4 16.7 21.0 96.6
Simple average 7.1 12.0 13.3 13.1 3.1 12.1 12.7 13.9 15.0 8.2
Weighted average 6.3 11.4 9.1 10.3 2.0 9.2 9.2 10.6 16.2 7.4
Maximum rate 30 30 20 30 30 25 100 25 100 108
Minimum rate 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Agricultural products 11.4 14.1 16.1 15.3 6.8 18.9 21.6 20.0 24.4 9.4
A
v
er
ag
e 
ra
te
s 
Non- agricultural products 6.5 11.7 12.8 12.8 2.5 11.0 11.2 12.9 13.5 8.0
Domestic spikes (3*average) (% lines) 2.2 0 0 0.0 14.8 0 0.5 0 1.0 8.8
International (>15%) (% lines) 9.5 35.2 40.9 36.7 7.7 35.0 40.7 33.2 36 21.9
Nuisance (0<t<2%) (% lines) 0.8 - - - - - - - - 1.3
D
is
p
er
si
o
n
 
Coefficient of variation 0.92 0.51 0.44 0.72 2.55 0.80 0.91 0.66 0.90 1.35
Source: TRAINS database and World Trade Profiles (2006) 
 
Similarly, negotiating with outsiders may also be problematic, especially for a group that 
includes LDCs that are not required to provide reciprocal access. The European Union, for 
example, is currently negotiating EPA agreements with groups of countries that include least 
developed countries that enjoy unilateral preferences and other countries that are going to be 
obligated to provide reciprocity relatively quickly.  If the LDCs try to cash in on these benefits, 
though, their CET is no longer viable. Fourth, small countries in particular may find their ability 
to affect policy extremely limited as formal equality among members is belied by power realities. 
Draper et al. (2007) give a great example: “It is said that in Mercosur, the Latin American 
customs union, there is decision-making by consensus, as long as Brazil agrees.”   Finally 
although the SACU experience shows that sharing tariff revenues can be done, as the earlier 
discussion indicates, it can also be extremely problematic. 
                                                 
46 There is a reasonably high degree of correlation in weighted average tariff levels across 
industrial sectors for some of the countries (Madagascar, Mozambique, Zambia, DRC and Tanzania), but a 
very weak correlation for SACU, Malawi and Mauritius. 
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 All told, these considerations raise questions about the viability of customs unions among 
large diverse groups of countries at very different stages of economic development. They suggest 
that many of the goals of increased integration may be better met by establishing free trade 
agreements (FTAs) rather than customs unions. The downside of FTA’s is that they require rules 
of origin, but in principle there is no need for these to be restrictive and the great upside is that 
they provide scope for countries to differ in  their policies with respect to non-members. 
Specifically, for example, in a SADC FTA, the least developed countries could continue to 
implement infant industry protection and avoid full reciprocity with the European Union when 
receiving preferences. SACU could implement industrial policies and a tariff regime that best 
suits its interest. It could negotiate freely with third parties and avoid the issue of tariff revenue 
sharing.  By contrast, the erection of large, meg-regional customs unions in SADC is both 
unrealistic and undesirable. Potential members are at very different stages of development, they 
have different relationships with third parties, and differ in the degree to which they are ready to 
come into full compliance. There is also no reason why, even if they only operate Free Trade 
Agreements, countries could not develop deep and cooperative policies relating to trade 
facilitation, rules of origin, competition policy, industrial policy, foreign investment, standards 
and technical barriers, dispute settlement etc. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) among Canada, Mexico and the United States is an example of deep economic 
integration within such a framework.  
  SACU has been valuable for both South Africa and the BLNS but it is not really a model 
that currently is ready to be extended to the large number of countries that make up the SADC.    
More work clearly needs to be done in SACU to resolve problems vis-à-vis the current tariff 
structure; the revenue sharing formula; and the effective implementation of joint decision-
making, the operation of a common industrial policy and other issues relating to government 
capacity.  
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 Policy Options: RSF Reform.  The most urgent issue relates to the RSF. It should be 
reformed. This could occur in a number of ways. The most straightforward would be for South 
Africa to simply announce that the RSF is no longer acceptable. This could lead to considerable 
friction. Another approach would be to try to achieve reform of the RSF in the context of either 
new accessions to SACU – e.g. Mozambique -- or a SADC CET. But this could either lead to 
difficult negotiations if the BLNS were to be faced with revenue losses or require South Africa to 
commit to additional outlays. 
 Alternatively, renegotiation could occur in the context of a major change in SACU tariffs. 
The adoption of radically simplified tariff structure for SACU as suggested in the previous 
section would provide an opportunity for renegotiating the Revenue-Sharing Formula.  The 
BLNS would benefit considerably from a reformed structure, since they consume but do not 
produce many of the products whose tariffs would be reduced. However, the approach could 
radically reduce SACU tariff revenues and under the current arrangement, the BLNS would bear 
about 80 percent of this reduction. They would be sure to request some form of compensation. In 
response, South Africa could cushion their adjustment through an explicit SACU development 
program that would involve financial contributions disbursed as aid rather than as tariff-revenue 
sharing. South Africa would provide long run commitments for the size of the fund and the BLNS 
countries could be given time to implement alternative revenue raising measures as the new tariff 
reform is implemented. The residual SACU tariff revenues could then be shared using a much 
simpler formula more likely to approximate national outlays on import duties. Since keeping 
track of the destination of imports entering SACU is complicated, a simpler basis such as GDP 
shares would be a natural benchmark. Another simple approach could be to share the revenues in 
proportion to population.  Such a per capita approach would have the virtue of emphasizing 
regional solidarity, with the highest transfers as a share of per capita income, going to the poorest 
countries.  Once such a formula was agreed upon, SACU would be in a much better position to 
consider either new members, or the formation of an SADC customs union. 
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 SADC Customs Union? The second major area of concern is South Africa’s regional 
integration policies. As many have pointed out, there is simply no way all the members of all the 
current arrangements can meet their pledges. Instead of subjecting one or more of these countries 
to the embarrassment of having to choose among their obligations, a simpler approach would be 
for SADC to explicitly postpone implementation of the Customs Union indefinitely. This might 
entail some short run political costs, but would have the advantage of clearing the air and making 
SADC commitments more credible. Alternatively, the political problems relating to the current 
pledges to establish an SADC customs union by 2010 could be finessed by simply allowing the 
date to lapse and/or explicitly setting a much later date for the union to come into being.  De facto 
therefore this would involve a regional trade configuration with SACU as a fully fledged customs 
union (matched by the EAC) and SADC as an FTA. 
  Headline commitments to the formal structure of a customs union are in any case less 
important than undertaking trade liberalization and facilitation measures that genuinely stimulate 
intra-regional trade. From the viewpoint of most participants, the key ingredient is not a customs 
union but a network of viable African free trade arrangements that are feasible, credible and 
effective.  For the foreseeable future, therefore, the SADC should concentrate on deepening its 
operation as a free trade area. This would ensure duty-free access for South African goods and 
services, while not subjecting the arrangement to unrealistic or inconsistent expectations. SADC 
members would then be free to get the best deals they could from EPAs with the EU. At the same 
time, intra-SADC trade could be further promoted through the adoption of more liberal rules of 
origin and liberalization in services trade.  SADC is already committed to negotiate services 
liberalization and the payoff from this is likely to be greater than that from completing the 
movement from an FTA to a customs union. This is particularly valuable for South Africa since 
services are not covered in SACU but all members of SACU are also members of SADC.  
 SACU should not seek to join Comesa because the problems it faces in this respect 
resemble those of SADC but it could propose a Comesa-SADC FTA.  It could also offer 
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countries such as Kenya, Uganda (or the whole EAC) the opportunity to negotiate an FTA with 
SACU.    
 While other countries in Africa might not be ready to eliminate their trade barriers, South 
Africa also needs to play defense and ensure that its exports are not discriminated against.  The 
SADC trade protocol prohibits members countries from offering trade benefits to a third country 
without extending them immediately to all SADC members and this is an important insurance for 
South Africa  Accordingly it should insist on genuinely most-favored nation treatment for goods 
services and investments from all trading partners to which it grants preferential treatment. For 
example, African countries should not grant products or services from the EU (or the US or 
China) better treatment than they give to products or services made by their neighbors. A similar 
provision in an SADC-Comesa FTA would give South Africa what it needs.  
 In sum, South Africa’s regional trade arrangements do present challenges but they also 
offer important opportunities. The key steps now are to place both the revenue sharing formula 
and the overall configuration of regional trade agreements on a sustainable basis. 
Conclusions.
 SACU has come a long way in improving its trade regime, but more work needs to be 
done. The tariff structure remains complex, lacking in transparency, protectionist and penalizes 
exports. While the current structure does support some jobs at relatively low costs, many other 
tariffs impose social costs that are several multiples of the wages earned in the jobs they support 
and consumer costs that are as high as thirty times such wages.  This is significant because the 
incidence of tariffs is regressive since poor households spend higher shares of their incomes on 
traded goods.  Not only is it inefficient and regressive but there is no coherent rationale for the 
current structure. In particular, infant industry considerations cannot explain it and it appears to 
reflect a preservationist rather than strategic orientation.  
 A number of much simpler tariff structures could achieve better results. In particular, 
employment could be more efficiently supported, transparency improved, exports promoted, 
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consumer benefits enhanced, and industrial policy priorities clarified. Adoption of a simpler 
structure would also provide an opportunity for SACU to rationalize its revenue sharing formula 
and place its relationships with other trading partners on a more sustainable footing.  
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Table D. South African Trade with SADC  
  2000 2005 2006     
  SOUTH AFRICA'S EXPORTS      
Total World  211,399,485,407 331,407,199,177 396,528,789,303     
Total SADC 21,996,697,570 31,798,380,705 35,892,629,593     
 Angola 1,375,926,085 3,535,751,384 4,739,163,283     
 Botswana 1,136,423 NA NA     
 Congo, DR 888,958,480 1,807,178,789 2,554,532,457     
 Lesotho NA NA NA     
 Madagascar 308,276,178 538,874,825 515,651,738     
 Malawi 1,669,001,960 1,637,853,052 1,686,546,510     
 Mauritius 2,006,574,498 2,190,087,390 1,995,517,270     
 Mozambique 4,996,925,220 6,402,557,319 6,240,445,459     
 Namibia 261,453 NA NA     
 Swaziland 949,125 NA NA     
 Tanzania 1,326,832,823 2,757,256,358 2,765,244,042     
 Zambia 4,562,491,217 5,441,962,992 7,984,927,032     
 Zimbabwe 4,859,364,108 7,486,858,596 7,410,601,802     
  SOUTH AFRICA'S IMPORTS     
Total World  188,078,203,665 351,664,971,434 465,040,209,075     
Total SADC 2,424,588,412 10,181,097,341 13,153,459,390     
Total SACU 4,124,662 2,743,120,827 2,714,212,889     
SADC-SACU 2,420,463,750 7,437,976,514 10,439,246,501     
 Angola 67,891,350 1,891,096,822 2,486,136,775     
 Botswana 995,526 1,926,034,593 1,802,623,289     
 Congo, DR 9,482,307 26,738,184 49,244,950     
 Lesotho 54,414 1,701,993 83,343     
 Madagascar 21,170,793 11,194,349 13,317,153     
 Malawi 285,754,056 455,836,759 531,080,443     
 Mauritius 46,549,286 167,884,973 259,751,269     
 Mozambique 362,892,179 199,281,867 318,590,133     
 Namibia 978,279 815,112,913 910,698,405     
 Swaziland 2,096,443 271,328 807,852     
 Tanzania 24,677,774 250,825,952 305,470,671     
 Zambia 302,264,373 1,303,600,021 1,842,287,471     
 Zimbabwe 1,299,781,632 3,131,517,587 4,633,367,636     
